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The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is a political declaration and framework agreement
adopted in June 1999 to encourage and strengthen co-operation among the countries of South East
Europe (SEE) and to facilitate, co-ordinate and streamline efforts to ensure stability and economic
growth in the region. (see www.stabilitypact.org) 
The South East Europe Compact for Reform, Investment, Integrity and Growth (“The Investment
Compact”) is a key component of the Stability Pact under Working Table II on Economic
Reconstruction, Development and Co-operation. Private investment is essential to facilitate the
transition to market economy structures and to underpin social and economic development. The
Investment Compact promotes and supports policy reforms that aim to improve the investment cli-
mate in South East Europe and thereby encourage investment and the development of a strong pri-
vate sector. The main objectives of the Investment Compact are to:
– Improve the climate for business and investment. 
– Attract and encourage private investment.
– Ensure private sector involvement in the reform process.
– Instigate and monitor the implementation of reform.
The participating SEE countries in the Investment Compact are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. Building on the
core principle of the Investment Compact that “ownership” of reform rests within the region itself, the
Investment Compact seeks to share the long experience of OECD countries. It provides region-wide
peer review and capacity building through dialogue on successful policy development and ensures
identification of practical steps to implement reform and transition.
The work of the Investment Compact has been actively supported and financed by seventeen
OECD member countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United
States. (see www.investmentcompact.org) 
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FOREWORD
Economic revitalisation of the South East Europe (SEE) region is primarily dependent on private sector
investment. Through the Investment Compact process, Stability Pact partners support and promote structural
policy reforms to improve the climate for private enterprise and increase investment. This Regional
Enterprise Policy Performance Assessment (EPPA) is designed to assist countries in SEE to become more
competitive by stimulating entrepreneurship and enterprise development. 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the SEE region face major challenges. As well as lack of
scale, resources and the capacity to handle complex business management, they frequently suffer from a
complicated and bureaucratic environment that is a legacy of the past. The challenges of business entry,
survival and growth are great. Developing a framework for dynamic entrepreneurship is fundamental in creating
healthy and competitive market economies, and thus generating new jobs, exports and economic growth.
To harness the potential offered by the SME sector, some important questions are adressed:
• What are the key features of good performance in SME policy making?
• How do the countries of the SEE compare with each other in tackling these key features?
• How do they fare in relation to EU and OECD member countries?
• What issues should be prioritised in order to match international good performance?
• What progress is being achieved and how is this changing over time?
This regional report is the first attempt to systematically address these important questions on a cross-
regional basis. It focuses in particular on two key elements in evaluating enterprise policies: how do SME
owners and managers perceive the policy performance of governments in the SEE region; and how do the
countries compare with each other in relation to key dimensions of good performance in SME policy making?
The Regional EPPA draws on the practical experience and views of SME representatives and expert
advisors, as well as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Office of
the Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), two Stability Pact
partner organisations that have been closely involved in the reform process in transition countries. It
completes the first cycle of policy performance assessments started in the second half of 2002 that led to the
publication of nine individual EPPA country reports and this regional synthesis. 
Measurable progress has been made across the six dimensions of good performance that the report
focuses on. Nevertheless, reforming the environment for entrepreneurship and ensuring effective
implementation of enterprise policy remain important and urgent priorities. The report sets out a detailed
Agenda for Regional Action, which governments in the region are strongly encouraged to implement. 
The report provides valuable insights into the key issues confronting the governments of the SEE region.
It is also directed to the organisations representing entrepreneurs, to the donor agencies of the OECD
member countries and the International Financial Institutions providing technical and financial assistance in
the area of enterprise development, and in general at the whole SME community in South East Europe.
The Enterprise Policy Performance Assessments contribute to supporting enterprise development in 
the region through monitoring performance and instigating action to implement policy reform. A new cycle of
Enterprise Policy Performance Assessments will be conducted by the OECD, EBRD and EC in partnership with
SEE Countries in 2004. 
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1. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs or small enterprises) are of critical importance to the
economic growth prospects of developed as well as transition economies. They account for 99.8% of all
enterprises and two-thirds of all jobs in European Union (EU) countries (EC, 2002a), however, their
importance does not rest only on being employment generators. They play an important role in
strengthening economic performance, something which is particularly important during the general
slowdown in global economic growth. They are adept at responding to market opportunities; and a sub-
set of high growth small firms are particularly important in raising innovation, productivity and
competitiveness. The challenge for governments is to: 
"... provide a business environment that supports the competitiveness of this large heterogeneous business
population and that promotes a vibrant entrepreneurial culture." (OECD, 2003a, p.7)
2. This South East Europe (SEE) Regional Enterprise Policy Performance Assessment (EPPA) focuses
on six key issues, which together constitute a framework enabling governments in the SEE region to
develop a supportive environment for small businesses in the SEE region:
• Institutional framework for SME policy.
• Rule of law and the regulatory environment.
• Tax policy for small businesses.
• Financial instruments for fostering small businesses.
• Advisory services supplied to new and small businesses.
• Business incubator support to start-ups.
3. The above framework arose from detailed research and case experience with transition economies
(OECD-UNIDO, 1999). It is consistent with the European Union's (EU) enterprise policy accession agenda,
as set out in its Charter for Small Enterprises (EC/DG Enterprise, 2000), to which the countries in the SEE
region have became signatories in June 2003. The EPPA work and the EC Charter are complementary and
closely inter-related (see figure 1-1). Future up-dates of the Regional EPPA report will increasingly integrate
with the EU's Charter (see Annex 1), as the OECD, EBRD and the EC (DG Enterprise) co-operate closely on
the agenda for small enterprise development in SEE.
4. Under the EPPA approach SME investors are extensively researched so as to provide practical
feedback on key small enterprise policy issues. Their views and perceptions on what is necessary for the
SME sector – from the business perspective – are vital to the success of government policy making and
reform. These perspectives are combined with other information and analysis (e.g. costs, benchmarks,
indicators of good practice, etc.), thus allowing a regional comparative analysis, focusing on highlighting
good performance and trends in the region.
5. The report sets out the main small enterprise development trends in the region and presents an
agenda for regional action.
1.2. Agenda for Regional Action
Institutional Framework
6. The state has a central and lead role to play in establishing the framework for small enterprise policy
development, so as to maximise the contribution of new jobs, business growth, productivity, and
competitiveness. Most countries of SEE have been very active in this regard, and in some cases there has
been significant institutional change but an excessive degree of uncoordinated and sustained reform.
7. The SME institutional framework accross the region is increasingly supported by strategies, action
plans, and implementing agencies, etc. However, these are rarely underpinned by adequate national and
international resources to implement the programmes of activity for the benefit of small enterprises and
start-ups. Securing the sustainability of institutions that support SMEs is not easy and requires not only a
stable environment, but also active proponents of SME policy and the necessary means to attract and
retain competent staff. 
8. In general, there is a lack of regular and effective dialogue and consultation between government
and the business sector. Policies, programmes and activities to stimulate start-ups and/or assist the
development of existing enterprises require the active awareness and involvement of the private sector.
While the government must do its part, the SME policy community equally needs to organise itself so as
to act as a more effective partner with the government than is the case at present.
9. There is a need to improve co-ordination and build wider synergies between the activities of the
institutions operating at national level (ministry of economy, SME agency, etc.) and the institutions
operating at local level, supporting SMEs and regional development. Often the impact of the government
policy in support to small business is not felt beyond the capital and the main cities. The network of
Regional Development Agencies, now operating in several SEE countries, could be used better to provide
valuable inputs to the national institutions and could be used for delivering policy at local level. 
10. It is difficult for Ministries/Agencies responsible for small enterprise policy to secure resources with
which to implement their policies, programmes and strategies. The wider use of performance
measurement mechanisms would enable them to assess the extent to which they are meeting 
their objectives. It would also enable them to demonstrate to politicians and stakeholders the
Ministries'/Agencies' performance, an important element of being able to secure more stable and
adequate budgets. Countries could also begin by publishing "annual reports" disseminating  more
awareness of their activities and assessing the extent to which the SME strategy is being implemented. 
1. Executive Summary 
10 SOUTH EAST EUROPE REGION - ENTERPRISE POLICY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT - © OECD 2003  
Figure 1-1. Links Between EPPA and EU Charter for Small Enterprises
EPPAs EC Charter
Institutions Representation of Small Business Interests
Regulations Cheaper and Faster Start-up
Better Legislation and Regulation
Improving Online Access
Taxation Taxation and Financial Matters
Finance Taxation and Financial Matters
Advisory Services E-Business Models and Small Business Support
Business Incubators E-Business Models and Small Business Support
Not covered as separate Education, Training and Entrepreneurship
sections at present Availability of Skills
Obtain more from the Single Market
Strengthen Technological Capacity
Regulatory Environment
11. Barriers to business entry throughout the countries in the SEE region remain unnecessarily high. At the
entry stage, the number of procedures, the lengthy delays and costs of registration, and the minimum paid-
up capital requirements, all make the process very slow, costly and complex. In addition, companies in the
SEE countries face complex and often non-transparent procedures for obtaining and renewing permits and
licences, particularly building and land development permits, with a negative impact on the company
operations. 
12. Various measures to simplify and speed-up registration, including the creation of a single
registration form and identification number, the introduction of electronic on-line registration, a single
point of contact to facilitate registration, and introduction of the "silence is consent" principle, would help
lead to greater entrepreneurship and economic dynamism. 
13. Consideration should be given to removing the need for active court involvement in the
registration process. The lack of resources, bottlenecks and unclear procedures in many courts all
contribute to serious delays and additional compliance costs for enterprises, especially micro- and small
businesses. 
14. Collectively, the burden on business operation deriving from administrative barriers is one of the
key factors, together with tax policy, pushing firms to operate, totally or partially in the informal economy.
The high incidence of the informal economy not only reduces the level of state revenue collection, but
also leads directly to a high degree of unfair competition vis-à-vis formally registered firms.
Tax Policy
15. The tax system is of critical importance to new or small enterprises. Although the virtues of a
simple, clear and stable tax system are increasingly recognised, no country in SEE has so far implemented
it on a consistent basis.
16. The tax systems in the SEE region experience constant changes, often with little or no advance warning
or adequate training either for the tax administration or for businesses. The general lack of consultation,
information and preparation contributes to low levels of trust between business people and the tax services.
17. While tax rates and incentives are for governments to determine, selected measures to reduce the
burden on the small enterprise sector should be considered. These could include:
• Setting benchmarks for VAT refunds and ensuring that they are respected.
• Reducing reliance on pre-paid taxes.
• Simplifying payment procedures, including frequency and method of payment.
• Clarifying all taxes, incentives, penalties, etc. and ensuring that tax officers are fully trained to
administer these. 
• Creating dispute resolution procedures, mechanisms and ombudsmen.
• Establishing structured Business-Government dialogue and information provision.
18.  In many countries, the tax inspectorate is in need of urgent reform. It is often feared by
entrepreneurs throughout the region because there are numerous inspectorates with unclear roles and
responsibilities, operating in an uncoordinated manner and imposing a significant time cost on
entrepreneurs. There is also a strong perception that such inspectorates have the power either to impose
unreasonable penalties or to extract rents from small enterprises. They should be streamlined and their
remit and procedures should be more clearly defined and monitored.
1. Executive Summary 
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Access to Finance
19. Reform of the banking sector has proceeded rapidly throughout the SEE region, although the
timing and depth of the process varies. Privatisation, combined with the entry of foreign strategic
investors, has assisted the process of restructuring and recapitalisation of the commercial banking sector,
spreading as a result better banking practices, greater competition and higher profitability of banks. 
20. At the same time, the level of bank intermediation remains low, partly as a reaction to the various
banking crises, which led banks to be more risk averse. In line with this general aversion to risk, bank
credit to the enterprises in most countries is increasing at a slower pace than bank credit to households.
Furthermore, there is evidence of a clear link between the rapid increase in consumer lending 
and the entry of foreign investors into the banking sector. Thus, although banking reform is a pre-
requisite for efficient financial intermediation, it does not of itself ensure improved access to finance 
for enterprises.
21. The best mechanism to provide finance to small enterprises is to create dedicated channels for this
activity, such as microfinance banks, credit lines and public sector/NGO support for activities that are not
normally handled by commercial banks, such as start-ups. In this context the experience of the
microfinance banks in the region has been excellent in providing access to credit to SMEs, especially
micro enterprises. 
22. However, legal and regulatory barriers in the SEE region continue to impede the development of
such dedicated mechanisms for providing assistance to small enterprises. Excessive restrictions exist in
the banking sector, such as very high minimum capital requirements, high loan loss provisioning
requirements and restrictive definitions of acceptable collateral. 
23. The challenge remains to find the balance between prudential regulations and a flexible framework
facilitating lending activities, especially where other aspects of the regulatory environment are defective.
For example, the lack of effective land registries and cadastres precludes firms from using property as
collateral. As a consequence commercial banks require high levels of collateral, thus affecting the ability
of firms to borrow from formal channels. 
24. Throughout the SEE region, the state continues to make efforts to provide finance directly to
enterprises. Examples include credit guarantee funds and state-run programmes to provide subsidised
finance to small enterprises. These schemes, although designed to deal with a market failure by
improving enterprises' access to bank credit, often produce unwanted and damaging long-run
consequences, and should be re-considered. The state is generally ill-equipped to select the best among
the pool of small enterprises. Direct or indirect state intervention in the credit market tends to create
distortions, introduce non transparent discriminatory practices and produce opportunities for rent
seeking. 
25. State-backed and managed credit guarantee funds can lead to the misuse of taxpayer and donor
resources, and they may end up by slowing down the development of the local banking system, as
guarantees tend to relax the behaviour of banks, rather than stimulate them to implement appropriate
lending methodologies and proper risk evaluation.
26. Governments in the SEE region should focus on the proven areas of market failure, such as assistance
to start-ups and stimulating the development of mutual credit guarantee schemes, set up by groups of
private entrepreneurs. Further efforts are also required to improve the legislative and regulatory framework
so as to assist the diversification of sources of funding such as leasing, credit reference sources, etc.
1. Executive Summary 
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Access to Business Advisory
27. The continuing market failure in the provision of advice, information and consultancy to start-ups
and newly-established enterprises as shown by the EPPA research means that there will be a continuing
need for Business Advisory Centres (BACs), targeted almost exclusively at the small enterprise sector.
28. BACs have largely failed to become financially sustainable through charging for services such as
information, training, advice, and consultancy. Many have disappeared completely once donor funding
was terminated while others have had to transform themselves radically so as to deliver services to their
traditional clients (start-ups and small enterprises) as well as others willing to pay for those services. The
issue of how both the new and established BACs will continue in future remains largely unresolved in the
SEE region.
29. Both governments and international organisations need to recognise that the great majority of
these centres will not be able to rely on the private sector to be financially sustainable. On-going financial
support will be required if they are to deliver the services to businesses which would otherwise not be
available. Such an expectation needs to be built into the process of establishing and implementing BACs
by donors and SEE countries more systematically than may have been the case hitherto.
30. Part of the reason for their inability to become established is that the quality of their services is
considered to be highly variable, the range of services is not always attuned to the needs of the market,
and clients do not always obtain sufficient value-added. There is thus an urgent need for a much greater
focus on international standards, qualifications and certification in order to generate a greater willingness
on the part of entrepreneurs to use their services and pay for them.
31. The SME sector should take greater responsibility for the provision of business services that it
considers to be essential, rather than continuing to rely on government or international organisations to
do this for them. In certain countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, small enterprise-oriented networks of
support, information and advice provision are becoming established on a voluntary basis and delivering
a wide range of services customised to the specific needs of small enterprises. 
Incubators 
32. Few national governments have established a clear policy vis-à-vis development of business
incubators. They typically fail to spell out their rationale for developing business incubators as opposed to
other forms of business support, the exact institutions with responsibility for implementing these policies,
the long term resources required for the development of business incubators, etc.
33. Entrepreneurs, business representative organisations, as well as national, regional and local
authorities know remarkably little about business incubators. Despite extensive experience and good
practice established elsewhere, such information is rarely available. There is a need for good practice
experience and information on business incubators to be systematically disseminated in the SEE region.
34. Business incubators are known to improve start-up and survival rates, facilitate technology transfer
and innovation, generate employment and have a positive influence on economic development (OECD,
1999, 2000; OECD-UNIDO, 1999). However, there is a paucity of rigorous impact assessment of incubators
in SEE.
35. The prevailing emphasis across the region is on employment generation or "poverty reduction"
centres. While commendable in its latter aims and motives, there is a need for business incubators 
that focus on "business and wealth creation" and thereby attract ambitious people with the initiative and
skills to build sustainable growth companies. In general such people would not be the target of poverty
reduction measures but could ultimately be a key player in adressing the challenge of powerty reduction,
new job creation and local development.
1. Executive Summary 
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36. Business incubators in the SEE region are almost exclusively funded by international organisations
and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), with little national, regional or local government support
once donor funding runs out. The size, occupancy rate, number of tenants, etc. of business incubators in
the SEE region are typically well below the international norms, raising concerns about their effectiveness
and financial sustainability once donor / IFI subsidies terminate. 
37. Moreover, there is a lack of attention devoted to issues such as good governance, transparency of
operation, criteria for entry / exit of companies, range of services provided, special institutions to promote
business clusters and networking, etc. in the SEE region, which international experience highlights as
being of importance for enterprise development. 
1. Executive Summary 
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Chapter 2. 
INTRODUCTION
2.1. Nature of the Report
38. The SEE Region EPPA provides a comparative assessment of enterprise policy performance across
the SEE region. It identifies a series of benchmarks and good practice, presents assessment ratings on
policy performance by entrepreneurs (owners and managers of small businesses), research on
governments' performance in relation to enterprise policy, and highlights the key trends for the eight
countries in question. The report shows where SEE countries stand relative to each other and successful
practice in OECD countries, thus providing policy-makers with concrete pointers for reform.
39. The report focuses on six broad dimensions of the framework and environment supporting SME
growth and development that are considered to be particularly important for governments in transition
economies to implement, if they are to make small enterprise policy effective (OECD-UNIDO, 1999) namely:
• Institutional framework for SME policy: the general fragility of the small enterprise sector in transition
economies necessitates an institutional support framework. Although no single best practice model
exists, successful practice suggests that there are certain elements which government should
undertake in order to ensure that the institutional infrastructure supports small enterprise
development.  
• Rule of law and the regulatory environment: in some countries, entry and exit obstructions and other
administrative obstacles may merely constitute irritants to small enterprise development. However,
in the context of transition economies where small enterprises possess limited human resources
and financial means, these may represent a major barrier to doing business and contribute to the
increase in size of the gray economy. A related factor is that the poor operation of the judiciary,
combined with its limited ability to enforce contractual obligations, often adds to the barriers
encountered by small enterprises. 
• Tax policy for small businesses: tax policy and administration are of fundamental importance in an
environment where small enterprises have very limited time and resources to deal with the tax
system. Instability, complex systems and burdensome monitoring and inspections are issues of
importance to small businesses which need to be tackled urgently. The necessity for a stable, clear
and simple tax system is particularly evident in the region. 
• Financial instruments for fostering small businesses: Commercial banks and other financial institutions have
traditionally considered small enterprises as being a highly risky category of business. Yet, access
to formal sources of finance is of crucial importance to the start-up, growth and competitiveness of
enterprises that have traditionally relied heavily on family, friends and other informal sources of
working capital and investment funds.
• Advisory services supplied to new and small businesses: market failure is common in the provision of
information, advice and other services to stimulate the creation of start-ups and assist the
development of new firms. After about ten years of experience with the provision of business
support services of various sorts, it is important to assess the extent to which these services are
being provided in an effective and sustainable manner in the region.
• Business incubators (support to new firms): newly established firms have a high mortality rate. Business
incubators can help businesses in their early days, for example by pooling resources and know-how,
by providing timely guidance and support services or by reducing costs such as rents. An
assessment of the development of these support structures in the SEE region is of importance.
40. Other dimensions of enterprise policy, such as provision of infrastructure, nature of the labour
market and development of a culture of entrepreneurship, also play a role in relation to small enterprise
policy performance in the SEE region. These dimensions are covered in other reports and some aspects,
especially those related to the EU Charter for Small Enterprises, will be incorporated in future regional
EPPA analyses (see figure 1-1.).
2.2. Methodology
41. This report draws on a series of OECD-EBRD Enterprise Policy Performance Assessments carried
out in 2002-2003 in all countries of the Stability Pact for SEE in order to monitor the development of
institutions, policies and programmes to support the SME sector. The individual country EPPAs (see
OECD-EBRD, 2003a to 2003i) place a strong emphasis on the views of small private enterprises concerning
their experience of the key barriers to carrying out their business and undertaking new investment. This
is an important aspect of assessing the progress made by governments in implementing policies that
stimulate the further development of SMEs. The country EPPAs provide a "snap-shot" of the business and
investment environment and highlight key issues in need of policy reform.
42. This report is the first edition of the SEE Region Enterprise Policy Performance Assessment (SEE EPPA)
report. The SEE EPPA is designed to complement the country EPPAs by monitoring recent developments
across the region as far as enterprise policy is concerned, thus seeking to share region-wide experience
and stimulate further policy dialogue and development in the countries in question, as well as in the SEE
region as a whole. The SEE EPPA complements the individual country EPPAs by:
• Focusing on the same six key dimensions of small enterprise good practice.
• Employing the qualitative analysis obtained from the country reports.
• Combining qualitative analysis with quantitative elements (e.g. costs, benchmarks, etc.).
• Presenting comparative information, focusing on good performance and trends.
43. The methodology employed in the Regional EPPA, building on the individual country EPPA
research, is set out in Annex 2. The Investment Compact intends to repeat this exercise on a regular basis,
highlighting and monitoring the evolving nature of enterprise policy in the region.
2.3. Economic Indicators
44. The recent stability in SEE and the strengthening of ties with the EU has helped the region as a
whole to achieve substantial growth over the past three years. This has also been assisted by on-going
domestic restructuring. In 2002 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region grew by nearly 5% on average,
with particularly strong growth in the three largest economies, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Recent
inflation performance has also been good, with low inflation now established in most countries and
significant reductions in the two countries still in double-digits, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro.
However, both fiscal and current account deficits are typically high in the region, and the risk of spiralling
twin deficits is exacerbated by the region's big expenditure requirements, falling aid flows and an already
substantial debt burden. The SEE region has so far had limited success, compared with for example
Central East Europe, in financing high investment requirements through private capital flows. To bridge
the gap created by falling official flows and to push the SEE region onto a higher growth path, the region
will have to establish an attractive investment climate for domestic and foreign investors alike.
45. Turning to enterprise-specific issues, table 2-2. provides some statistics on SMEs in the SEE region.
Whereas SMEs now account for an average of 98.1% of all enterprises in SEE, not far from the EU-plus
(European Union 15 + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, also known as EU-19) average of 99.8%,
other measures of the state of the enterprise sector show significant differences between the two regions.
16 SOUTH EAST EUROPE REGION - ENTERPRISE POLICY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT - © OECD 2003  
2. Introduction
SME density is extremely low, averaging 13.7 per 1000 inhabitants, compared with 52.8 in the EU-plus
countries. In the SEE region, SMEs are less important as employers than in the EU-plus region, accounting
for an average of 47% of total employment in the enterprise sector, as compared to an average of 66% in
the EU-plus area. The share of the private sector in GDP is also still very low at 58% in the SEE region, well
below the same value for the advanced transition countries set to become EU members in 2004.
46. Despite the anecdotal evidence suggesting that a significant degree of entrepreneurial spirit and
activity exists in SEE, the data show that the density of SMEs in the SEE countries is lower than the density
in the wider Western European region (EU-plus).  SMEs in the SEE region are still relatively few for the
size of these economies and they have not yet reached their potential in terms of either employment or
production. High unemployment persists in the region, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR
Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. New job creating enterprises are urgently needed. The rate of
new enterprise creation needs to be dramatically increased if the region is to match the levels of Western
Europe. This underlines the continuing importance of developing an appropriate policy framework to
assist start-ups and more established small enterprises in the SEE region.
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Table 2-1. Basic Economic Indicators (2002)1
AL2 BiH BG HR MK MD RO SCG
Population (millions) 3 4 8 4 2 4 22 8
GDP per capita in € 1,661 1,461 2,106 5,364 1,981 404 2,220 1,995
Gross average monthly earnings in € 165 293 136 724 185 45 175 150
Unemployment rate in % of labour force 16 41 17 15 32 7 8 28
GDP index 1989=100 114 54 80 87 75 39 88 51
General Government Expenditure in % of GDP 29 56 37 50 42 32 33 48
Private sector share in GDP 75 50 75 60 60 50 65 45
FDI cumulative 1989-2002 per capita in € 322 210 594 1,506 496 211 441 219
Source: EBRD
Table 2-2. Selected Entreprise Information
2002 2001 2000 2002 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000
AL BiH BG HR MK MD RO SCG EU-plus3
Number of SMEs 56,237 30,000 224,211 63,135 32,759 22,138 306,073 70,940 20,415,000
SMEs per 1,000 inhabitants 18.2 7.9 28.7 14.3 16.4 5.2 10.3 8.5 52.8
Share of SMEs in total number 99.5 99.3 99.7 99.3 99.0 90.0 99.7 98.4 99.8
of enterprises, of which:
Share of micro-enterprises 95.8 84.8 92.3 85.5 90.7 72.2 92.3 n/a 93.1
in total number of Enterprises
Share of small enterprises 2.7 11.2 5.7 11.3 5.9 17.8 5.7 94.4 5.9
in total number of enterprises
Source: EBRD and EC (2002b)
NOTES
1. Note: data in italics relate to 2001.
2. International licence plate codes have been used to identify the SEE countries: AL = Albania; 
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina; BG = Bulgaria; HR = Croatia; MK = FYR Macedonia; MD = Moldova; 
RO = Romania; SCG = Serbia and Montenegro (where the republics of Serbia and Montenegro are
separated, they are identified as SER and MON respectively). 
3. Notes: EU-plus = European Union 15 + Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland (also referred to
as EU-19); Albania: data includes enterprises in the agricultural sector; Croatia: micro-enterprises include
sole proprietors; Moldova: medium sized enterprises are included in the large category.
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47. Since the beginning of transition towards a market economy, all SEE countries have put SME
development at the top of their economic policy priorities and have embarked on building the
institutional framework for the elaboration and delivery of policies and programmes for the SME sector.
The SME sector is expected to be a source of new jobs and regional economic development. Institution-
building is the first step needed to put in place an effective SME policy. If the institutions are not properly
designed, adequately financed, well managed and their performance regularly evaluated, they will end
up wasting resources, pursuing inappropriate policies and damaging government credibility vis-à-vis the
business community. In assessing policies designed to enhance enterprise performance, it is essential to
examine where the SEE countries stand in creating their own institutional framework. 
48. This section examines the entrepreneurs' perception of the effectiveness of the institutional
framework, as derived from the individual country Enterprise Policy Performance Assessments (EPPA). It
examines the structure of the institutional frameworks established in the SEE region and measures their
main features against key indicators of successful experience. Conclusions are then drawn on what has
been achieved and what remains to be done. 
3.2. SME Insights
49. The EPPA country research was undertaken in the eight countries of the Stability Pact for SEE. In
addition to the in-depth focus group discussions on key issues confronting small enterprise managers and
owners, assessment ratings were obtained for each of the six dimensions of good practice explored in
relation to the business environment, which mirror the structure of this regional report.
50. The average ratings used to represent the views of the entrepreneurs ranged from 1 to 5 (read as
follows 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = good and 5 = very good). For each dimension of good
practice, the average ratings were analysed, resulting in the "Perceptions of the Institutional Framework"
presented in figure 3-1. The same approach is used in the other sections of this report pertaining to the
SME insights. The ratings provide an indication of the perceptions of the focus group entrepreneurs in
each country. Cross-regional comparisons provide useful insights, sharing of experience, and will become
more useful for policy makers as the EPPA process is repeated next time.   
51. Entrepreneurs in SEE are usually highly dissatisfied with the performance of the state institutions
in charge of SME policy. The results of the focus groups indicate that SME managers and owners view
these institutions as largely ineffective. They are perceived more as an additional layer of government,
operating with its own bureaucratic logic and rules than as an institutional partner working towards
common goals. This is a fundamental issue that needs to be tackled by all SEE countries.
52. What emerges from the focus groups views is a high level of mistrust as to the willingness and ability
of the government to actually implement policy measures that benefit small business. Entrepreneurs
generally complain that official policy statements are seldom followed by concrete actions. New institutions
are set up with ambitious targets, but behind them there is often an unclear strategy and limited human and
financial resources. Policies are often designed and introduced without consulting the SME community.
There are frequent institutional changes, driven mainly by political rather than operational considerations
and, therefore, a lack of continuity in building more lasting and effective institutions and policies.
53. Long delays in policy implementation and poor communication have aggravated the
entrepreneurs' negative perception of the institutional framework. Perceptions are particularly poor in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The first case may reflect the frustration of the business community
towards a framework perceived as very complex, fragmented and crowded by a large number of
institutions operating at state and entity level without any apparent co-ordination and substantial
progress. Serbia appears to be more a question of timing and communication. At the time the focus
groups were conducted (second half of 2002) Serbia was still catching-up with other SEE countries, having
initiated its economic and democratic transition considerably later than the others, but progress has been
made since then. Entrepreneurs in Croatia and Bulgaria gave comparatively better ratings regarding the
existing institutional arrangements, probably as a result of the fact that those two countries have
conducted an active SME policy for several years, within a relatively stable institutional framework.
54. The ratings also reflect the fact that generally the resources (staff and budgets) tend to be limited
and far from secure in nature. Most of the SEE countries allocate limited financial and human resources to
SME policy and, as a result, entrepreneurs are critical of the lack of visible programmes to stimulate small
business activity. The relatively better rates scored by Croatia and Bulgaria probably reflect the fact that
they have been actively working on programmes in support of  the small business sector longer than most
of the other SEE countries.    
3.3. Comparative Policy Assessment 
55. In addition to obtaining insights from small enterprise owners and managers on the key
institutional issues, the research also sets out a number of indicators of good performance derived from
research in transition economies (see OECD-UNIDO, 1999) against which the SEE countries are reviewed. 
3. Institutional Framework





































Figure 3-1.  Perceptions of the Institutional Framework
56. The architecture of the institutional framework varies considerably among the SEE countries,
however, national policies may be compared by looking at some of their key features. The general
aspiration in this area is to have a three-tier institutional framework (ministry + national SME agency +
regional SME offices) but what really counts is how the institutions actually perform and fulfil their tasks.
For each key feature of the institutional framework, benchmarks of good performance have been
identified and the position of each SEE country tested against them.   
57. The first consideration emerging from table 3-1. is that the process of building the institutions to
support the SME sector in SEE is well advanced. All countries have at least one institution (in two cases
more than one) responsible for SME policy and strategy development and nearly all countries have an
officially approved SME development strategy.
58. The weakness in the institutional framework lies in the implementation. Not all countries have
structured action plans, clear implementation responsibilities or a properly defined system for resource
allocation from the state budget. Even when a strategy and a budget allocation exist, the resources are
often not commensurate with the strategy objectives. A structured institutional framework, supported with
strategies and action plans, is of little practical consequence if not underpinned by adequate national 
and international resources so as to achieve the expected strategies and implement the programmes of
activity. The most likely outcome of the discrepancy between stated government objectives and actual
implementation is a high level of frustration among both entrepreneurs and the responsible civil servants.
Even the most qualified and motivated government officials struggle in this environment.    
59. A third consideration refers to the high level of institutional instability typical of the region. In
most OECD member countries political changes do not necessarily lead to institutional and personnel
changes unless there is a major turn in policy. In SEE, political change arising from elections or
government re-shuffles, tend to have a direct impact on the institutions (such as closure) and their key
personnel. This affects the capacity building process and results in major problems with continuity of
policies, initiatives, etc. 
60. The current impression is that many countries in SEE continue to experiment to find the "right"
model for SME development. These range from having a separate SME Ministry, making the agency a part
3. Institutional Framework 
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Table 3-1.  Institutional Benchmarks of Good Performance5
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Institutions 
responsible for SME 
1 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1policy/strategy 
development
Government- Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
approved strategy (yes RS, 
DB)
Structured Action Plan No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
for implementation (yes RS, 
of strategy DB)
An institution 
responsible for  
policy/strategy
No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
implementation
Existence of budget No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
for implementation  (yes 
of SMEstrategy DB)
of another Ministry, forming a separate agency, having both a Ministry and Agency, a unit/agency under
the Prime Minister's office and other variants (see box 3-1). Institutions are often not given enough time,
clear mandate and adequate resources to prove their effectiveness and build their skills and capacities.
Changes are often made without objective evaluation of the features of the previous configuration and
staff performance. Since December 2002 there have been major institutional and personnel changes in
SME institutions in Romania (the Ministry has been changed into an Agency), Bosnia and Herzegovina
(new SME Directorate at state level), Croatia (new agency created in 2003), Albania (an Agency for SMEs
created for the second time) and FYR Macedonia (new agency to be created), etc.
61. Despite these changing structures, the institutional framework is evolving in a positive way in
several SEE countries. Table 3-1. shows that in principle, a government-approved small enterprise
strategy exists in almost every country of SEE with the exception of Serbia (subsequently approved in
early 2003) and BiH (strategies exist for the District of Brcko and Republika Srpska). Bulgaria, Croatia,
Montenegro and Romania as well as the District of Brcko in BiH, are considered to have a sound resource
base, where the state budget funds are fairly significant and supplemented by EU, donor funds and
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), thus providing a significant degree of financial capacity to
implement meaningful programmes of activity. 
62. The lack of formal performance measurement of progress in implementing SME policy and
evaluating of quality/professionalism of activity is a weakness in the region. It inhibits institutions from
knowing the SME development progress that they are making; deprives them of a tool for persuading
government of fund their activities on a stable and on-going basis; and reduces their capacity 
to demonstrate progress to SMEs and the wider stakeholders. Table 3-2. presents a second set of
institutional features relative to the benchmarks of good performance. 
3. Institutional Framework
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Box 3-1. SME Institutions in SEE
There are many different institutional arrangements in the SEE region. The information below highlights
the key arrangements, including recent developments in 2003:
• Albania: Ministry of Economy (policy); Small Business Development Agency (implementation; created
in 2003).
• BiH: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations, Department for Entrepreneurship (policy;
state level - created in 2003); Federation (Ministry of Energy, Mining and Industry, Department for
Entrepreneurship and Production Handicrafts); Ministry of Industry and Technology, Department of
Private Entrepreneurship (Republika Srpska); Regional Development Agency (District of Brcko).
• Bulgaria: Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (policy and implementation, reporting to the
Council of Ministers); Ministry of Economy (finances the Agency).
• Croatia: Ministry of SMEs (policy); Agency for SMEs - HAMAG (implementation; created in 2003).
• FYR Macedonia: Ministry of Economy (policy); Agency to Support Entrepreneurship (implementation;
to be created).
• Moldova: Ministry of Economy (policy and implementation).
• Montenegro: Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Development (policy and
implementation, reporting to the Prime Minister).
• Romania: Ministry of SMEs and Co-operatives (policy and implementation - changed to agency in
2003).
• Serbia: Ministry of Economy (policy); Republican Agency for the Development of SMEs and
Entrepreneurship (implementation).
63. Institutional co-ordination is key to a well-balanced and effective policy towards the small business
sector, since many SME issues touch upon areas in the remit of a number of ministries and government
bodies (economy, finance, labour, justice, etc.), local administration and multilateral and bi-lateral donors.
The SEE countries fare relatively well in terms of inter-ministerial co-ordination. Almost every country has
instituted some form of inter-ministerial co-ordination, with the exception of Moldova, FYR Macedonia
and BiH (the District of Brcko has such a mechanism) and all the countries, excluding BiH and Serbia
operate on the basis of one SME definition, recognised by all the state institutions.
64. However, the effectiveness of all of these mechanisms is unclear at this stage since such initiatives
are relatively new. Inter ministerial co-ordination meetings need to be held regularly, ideally under the
authority of a senior cabinet member, and at the lower level, effective communication links have to be
established among different policy institutions. There needs to be a regular and structured evaluation as
part of a wider overall evaluation of enterprise policy performance.
65. External technical and financial assistance to the SME sector is significant in all SEE countries and
supplements the internal human and financial resources. While the SEE countries are generally quite
successful in mobilising international support for their SME policy, they often remain weak in ensuring
that external support is structured around the government's priorities for the development of SMEs.
Government-led donor co-ordination is in place in Albania, Romania, Serbia, Moldova and Bulgaria, with
varying degrees of effectiveness. Some informal donor co-ordination happens in other countries. This
should occur regularly, ideally led by the government, in order to maximise effectiveness.
66. A third dimension of policy co-ordination concerns the level of dialogue and co-operation between
national and local institutions. All SEE countries have established local development institutions that are
involved in SME support activities. The SME Agencies in Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and FYR Macedonia
have developed their own regional networks, which tend to be rather loose structures. The other countries
tend to rely heavily on existing arrangements such as regional, county and local authority structures, as well
as IFI and donor-funded initiatives, which typically include Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), as well
as small business advisory centres of various types and the network of Chamber of Commerce offices. By
and large, the regional institutional infrastructure is inadequate. Often the channels of co-ordination and
communication between national and local institutions are rudimentary or not yet properly structured.  
3. Institutional Framework 
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Table 3-2.  Additional Institutional Benchmarks of Good Performance 
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Inter-Ministerial    
Co-ordination and Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Consultations on SME (yes, DB)
SME Donor Co-ordination Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
led by government/agency
Existence of institutions  Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes
responsible for policy/strategy other other own other own other own other own
implementation
at regional level
Regular SME stakeholder  No (yes, Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes
consultation mechanisms No FBiH, DB)
Number of SME definitions 1 None 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
used (1 FBiH)
Compatibility of SME No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
definition(s) the EU definition 
67. Dialogue between the government and the business sector is vital at all key stages of policy-
making: during the elaboration of the strategy, the identification of the policy targets, the preparation of
the action plans, the selection of policy tools and the policy implementation phase. This dialogue is also
the conduit for building trust in government initiatives. In the SEE region, systematic policy consultation
in the small enterprise policy area is still the exception rather than the rule (see table 3-2). 
68. Over the last few years most SEE countries have established consultation forums at national
government level to discuss the main economic issues (budget, infrastructure development, labour and
social policy), but the voice of the small business community is seldom heard. Only Serbia, Bulgaria and
Romania have established channels of communication dedicated to the SME sector, although these are
not yet well developed (OECD-EBRD, 2003i, 2003c and 2002). Many SME development agencies now
include private sector representatives as board members. This is a positive development, but does not
substitute for regular policy consultation. Building an effective mechanism of policy consultation is a
complex process. The current weakness of the small business sector representation in most of the SEE
countries, with the exception of Romania, highlights the need for greater government efforts in this area.
Policy dialogue should not be restricted to organisations such as the Chambers of Commerce, the
Employers' Federations and Social and Economic Councils at the national level. To sum-up the current
institutional framework for enterprise policy development, figure 3-2. maps out the degree of deviation
from benchmarks of good performance in each SEE country, taking the issues detailed in tables 3-1. and
3-2. into consideration. 
69. Bosnia and Herzegovina shows the largest divergence from the benchmark. The SME policy
institutional framework at the state level is still very under-developed, while the two Entities retain the
lead in SME policy making. The picture at Entity level is quite complex, while the District of Brcko has made
substantial progress in introducing successful practices. At the other extreme, Romania does well in terms
of institutional development, although these achievements may be threatened by the level of institutional
instability which continues. Croatia and Bulgaria have scope for further development at institutional level
3. Institutional Framework
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Figure 3-2. Deviation from Institutional Good Performance 
whereas the other SEE countries are at an intermediate stage of building and operating a structured SME
policy framework. They are all moving in the right direction. Serbia and FYR Macedonia have some catching
up to do, but both have been among the most active in institution-building since the beginning of 2003.
NOTE
4. The benchmarks good institutional performance are derived from OECD-UNIDO (1999). Due to its
complexity, the information for BiH refers to the state of BiH unless otherwise specified (Federation of BiH
- FBiH, Republika Srpska - RS and the District of Brcko - DB). The republics of Serbia (SER) and
Montenegro (MON) are treated separately as their SME arrangements are different and some of the
research preceded the establishment of the State Union. Where information is only available for the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the tables and graphics indicate this accordingly (SCG).
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70. The regulatory environment in SEE is generally very problematic for small and medium-sized
businesses. High administrative barriers and protracted and complex compliance procedures have
serious consequences for smaller enterprises, particularly start-ups, as they often divert very limited
resources away from productive activity. In addition, a poor regulatory environment provides enterprises
in the gray economy with an incentive and justification for conducting informal business operations.
Regulatory reform is, therefore, a crucial component of government enterprise policy. 
71. This chapter begins, with an overview of SMEs' perceptions of the regulatory environment
expressed by SME managers and owners in the EPPA research. This is followed by a review of the key
aspects associated with business regulations. The focus is mainly on business entry barriers and company
registration procedures, making use of other research built up in recent years by the World Bank and
FIAS5. This information is used to assess how SEE countries perform against a number of benchmarks
derived for the EU country context. 
4.2. SME Insights
Figure 4-1.  Perceptions of the Regulatory Framework
72. Based on the entrepreneurs' assessment of the regulatory situation in their respective countries,
none of the countries of SEE attained a "satisfactory" rating with respect to the regulatory environment.
Company registration procedures have been greatly simplified and accelerated in Montenegro, following
the implementation of the Enterprise Law (2001). It now costs €11 to register a company and courts must
register firms within four days. The positive consequences for enterprises may be detected in the rating
obtained for Montenegro (see also table 4-1). At the opposite end of the spectrum, BiH and Serbia are
struggling with the regulatory and legal barriers to investment, as reflected in the earlier analysis and
related reports (see OECD, 2003a; OECD-EBRD, 2003i and 2003b; FIAS, 2001 and 2002). 
73. Entrepreneurs in general maintain that the regulatory environment remains expensive, opaque
and problematic for small businesses in the SEE region. In recent years, there has been greater
recognition at government level of the need to simplify the business environment. Almost every country
has recently undertaken a survey of legal and administrative barriers to business. These have been
typically followed-up with Business Simplification Task Forces of various sorts (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, FYR
Macedonia and Croatia), designed to identify problems and solutions and move ahead rapidly with
implementation. These programmes tend to be ambitious in scope and in general, with the exception of
Montenegro, small business representatives detect little "concrete" improvement as of the end of 2002,
when the EPPA fieldwork and research was completed.
74. Business people are uniformly concerned about the level of informal activity, as well as the degree
of bribery and corruption which is involved in doing business in the SEE region. The actual degree of unfair
competition that results for the formally registered firms varies from country to country. Governments have
typically responded by establishing Anti-Corruption or Informal Activity programmes and institutions. The
entrepreneurs are not impressed with the results achieved so far and call for rapid and visible results on
the ground, starting with a stronger political commitment to tackling these issues.
4.3. Comparative Policy Assessment
75. An excessive number of procedures are involved in most countries of SEE for the registration of a
new limited liability company. Best international practice suggests that a single procedure could
eventually be feasible in the SEE region. Montenegro has led the way in this area introducing in 2001 an
extensive reform of company registration that has sharply reduced the number of procedures required.
Its experience indicates that the benchmarks are not out of reach for the SEE countries.
4. Regulatory Environment
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Table 4-1. Business Entry Benchmarks of Good Performance6
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK7 MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Number of procedures 
to register a limited 11 12 10 13 7 11 4 9 16 1
liability company
Days to register a company 62 74 30 50 48 41 4 46 71 3 days
Costs to register a 
company (€) 655 656 132 746 240 118 11 579 194 210
Minimum paid-up capital 770 5,100 2,560 2,560 2,500 625 1 60 5,000 3,000
for mandatory procedures FBiH, local or
relating to limited liability 2,560 RS 5,000 1,250
companies (€) foreign
Source: World Bank (2002) and EC (2002a)
76. Similarly, the number of days required to register a company are excessive, resulting in delays,
costs and frustration for potential entrepreneurs, some of which may be discouraged from becoming
entrepreneurs and/or encouraged to operate in the informal economy. The worst performer is Bosnia and
Herzegovina (74 days, although it should be noted that the District of Brcko has set itself a target of eight
days), closely followed by Serbia9. By far the best performer is again Montenegro, followed by Bulgaria,
which is able to register firms within 30 days. Croatia has set itself the same 30 days target, but appears
to be failing to achieve it. Romania is reportedly approaching the 20 days mark in 2003. Best international
practice among OECD member countries suggests that a target of three days should not be beyond reach,
eventually reduced to one day. 
77. In addition to time, the average entrepreneur in SEE has to spend financial resources on
government duty and professional fees, and to satisfy the minimum capital requirements. These are
significant in relation to the low per capita income. The experience of Montenegro shows that by cutting
steps and procedures (including curbing the mandatory capital requirement), it is possible to bring down
registration costs substantially.
78. The rationale behind the different levels of minimum paid-up capital for limited liability companies
is unclear in the SEE context. This amount varies a great deal from as low as €1 (in Montenegro) to around
€5,000 in Serbia, the Federation of BiH and FYR Macedonia (in the case of foreign-owned companies).
Most SEE countries fall below the EU benchmark (€3,000), arguably a high benchmark for the economic
conditions in the SEE region. A high minimum paid-up capital requirement may well offer some protection
to suppliers and creditors, but it also acts as a significant barrier to entrepreneurship and new business
formation in the SEE region. 
79. Table 3-2. contains data on a number of other regulatory dimensions in relation to benchmarks of
good performance. 
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Figure 4-2.  Costs and Time Required for Business Registration
Source: World Bank (2002)
80. With low cost IT and Internet technology now more available, it should be possible to register
companies swiftly and at minimal cost (one day in some OECD member countries). Why this is not yet
happening is a question related to the quality of the institutional and legal framework and the efficiency
of the public administration. Company registration by Internet, currently not possible in any of the SEE
countries, is increasingly becoming a policy target for governments such as in Montenegro, but there is
likely to be stiff resistance from the commercial court system, for which this is a major revenue source.  
81. A first step in seeking to simplify and shorten the process is to enable entrepreneurs to register
companies using a single registration form and a unique identification number. Romania, Montenegro and
Moldova already use a single form, although the process is reportedly still complicated. All countries except
Albania have implemented a single registration number, thus ensuring a more effective co-ordination and
exchange of information among state administrations. The process of creating "one-stop-shops" for the
registration and licensing of new enterprises, as well as the re-registration of existing firms, is still at the early
stages in the SEE region. By far the most advanced country in this respect is Romania, where the Chamber
of Commerce and Industry took the lead in establishing a wide network of "one-stop-shops" throughout the
42 counties in the country, thus securing a high degree of convenience for entrepreneurs. Although this
process has been far from smooth (for example, the responsibility has been transferred from the Chambers
of Commerce to the Ministry of Justice) and is not yet functioning to the satisfaction of Romanian
entrepreneurs (see OECD-EBRD, 2003h), it provides an example for building up "one-stop-shop" networks.
82. The second step is forcing administrations to respond to entrepreneurs by introducing an
automatic approval (silent consent), a practice first adopted in the SEE by Montenegro where, if there is
no response within four days of submitting a company registration form, the assumption is that the
company has been registered (see OECD-EBRD, 2003g). Implementation of this concept is an important
development, which should accelerate the process of registration, increase transparency in the licensing
regimes and generally reduce the compliance burden, which enterprises face on a day-to-day basis.
Romania and Bulgaria have introduced silent consent in the meantime, and other countries in the SEE are
expected to follow suit in the coming years.
83. In all the SEE countries, the courts play a role in the company registration process. They may either
have a passive role, as a depository of the legal documents, or an active role, examining and approving
the registration of firms. The more active the court involvement, the longer and less transparent the
registration process tends to be. The court systems throughout the SEE region are under-resourced and
in urgent need of reform. Court registration adds very little to the quality of the process, but guarantees
to the courts a steady source of income and, to unscrupulous officials, an entrenched rent seeking position
that can be exploited for personal advantage. It is not entirely surprising that in many countries, proposals
for company registration reform are blocked by the resistance of some elements in the judiciary who are
unwilling to lose this lucrative function. 
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Table 4-2. Regulatory Benchmarks of Good Performance 
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Single registration form No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Single identification number No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Court approval for Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
registration
Single point of contact Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
for registration
Internet registration No No No No No No No No No Yes
Principle of No No No No No No Yes No No Yes
"silence is consent"
84. The regulatory environment covers much more than just company registration. Company
registration is in fact just the "tip of the iceberg". Entrepreneurs have indicated that all across SEE there
are still major issues with the procedures for obtaining operational licences, building permits and
respecting environmental and industrial standards. But what most concerns entrepreneurs is the
inequality in the application of the law. Entrepreneurs who work according to the rules often face unfair
competition from companies operating informally and avoiding taxes, social security obligations and
other rules and regulations. The pressure is such that many small businesses are compelled, sometimes
for the sake of sheer survival, to operate intermittently between the formal and the informal sectors.
85. The weight of the informal economy is significant throughout the SEE region, averaging around one-
third of the economy as measured by the Gross National Product (GNP). Measurement of the informal
economy is a notoriously difficult exercise and the above should be seen as indicative only. For example,
recent research suggests that the informal economy may have been reduced to between 25% and single
digit levels of GDP in Croatia (Ott, 2002), depending on the methodology employed. In Moldova,
indications suggest that the informal economy may be close to 70% of GDP. The exact extent of the
informal economy may be debated, however, what is not questioned is that its existence remains a
continuing challenge for all SEE countries with significant implications, such as the reduced tax base and
the high levels of unfair competition for the companies operating in the formal economy. 
86. A high level of informal activity is often associated with a correspondingly high incidence of
corruption and bribery. Poor public governance provides fertile ground for the growth of the informal
sector. The proportion of sales that is paid as unofficial "rents" to public officials as measured by the
BEEPS10 provides an indication of the scale of the issue. The "bribe tax" is particularly problematic 
in Albania (3.3%), Romania (2.6%) and Moldova (2.1%); but is somewhat less so in Croatia (0.6%), 
FYR Macedonia (0.8%) and BiH (0.9%), compared with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) average of
1.1%. A high proportion of enterprises (between 12.9% in Croatia and 36.7% in Romania) in SEE make
bribes frequently (see EBRD, 2002).
87. Every country of SEE is currently implementing government-approved initiatives designed to
counteract the effects of the informal economy, but there is still little hard evidence that this is having the
desired and rapid enough effect as far as formally registered enterprises, both large and small, are
concerned. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) identifies the degree of
corruption as seen by business people and risk analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) to 1 (highly
corrupt). As illustrated by table 4-3., only Bulgaria attains the average levels of CPI in CEE countries, while
Croatia is not far away. All other countries for which information is available perform significantly worse on
this index.
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Table 4-3. Informal Economy in SEE9
AL BiH BG HR MK MD RO SCG CEE
average
Informal economy (as % of GNP) 33.4 34.1 36.9 33.4 45.1 45.1 34.4 29.1 22.7
Percentage of firms making 36.4 22.4 32.8 12.9 22.7 34.3 36.7 15.9 22.6
bribes frequently
Average bribe tax as a % 3.3 0.9 1.9 0.6 0.8 2.1 2.6 1.5 1.1
of annual firm revenue
Corruption Perceptions Index 2.5 n/a 4.0 3.8 n/a 2.1 2.6 n/a 4.0 
(10 highly clean - to 1 highly corrupt) (81) (45) (51) (93) (77) (45)
and rank (out of 102)
Source: EBRD (2002); Schneider (2002a); Transparency International (2002).
NOTES
5. Data provided in this section might differ from those provided by national authorities. 
Information on the methodology used to collect these data can be accessed at:
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/Methodology/EntryRegulations.aspx
6. Information for procedures, duration and cost derived from World Bank (2002) Doing Business
Project; costs to register a company were converted from $ to € (€ 0.96 per $, 30 December 2002); the
benchmarks are derived from EC (2002a) Benchmarking the Administration of Business Start-ups.
7. The information for the Republic of Montenegro is derived from OECD-EBRD (2003g); information
for FYR Macedonia is derived from FIAS (2003).
8. The data collected by the World Bank are for Serbia and Montenegro together. However, the sample
is largely composed of companies located in Serbia, therefore, the information is used as an
approximation for Serbia. Data for Serbia only are not available.
9. Source: Derived from Schneider (2002a and 2002b); frequency of bribes and bribe tax derived from
EBRD (2002) Transition Report. Other estimates of the weight of the gray economy are available from
different sources, but are not quoted in this report as the methodologies used differ across countries and
made comparisons impossible. CEE average for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic.
10. The EBRD jointly with the World Bank launched the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) in 1999. The BEEPS asks enterprises to evaluate economic governance and
state institutions and assess the extent to which the business environment creates obstacles to the
operation and growth of their businesses. In 2002, a second stage of the BEEPS was undertaken, surveying
close to 6,000 firms across 26 countries of the region.
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Chapter 5. 
TAX POLICY FOR SMALL BUSINESSES
5.1. Introduction
88. Tax policy has a major impact on enterprise development. Given the limited access to bank credit,
working capital is a scarce and costly resource and companies have few options for balancing cash flow
fluctuations. Therefore, it is not only the total tax burden on companies that matters, but also the way the
tax administration affects companies' cash flows, on even a temporary basis, for instance by requiring tax
prepayments or by delaying VAT refunds. 
89. The design of the tax regime and the quality of the tax administration are of crucial importance to
small enterprises. The creation of a tax system that is stable, clear and simple is essential for businesses
with limited capacity and resources to devote to onerous fiscal compliance procedures. In this chapter, a
number of comparisons are made of successful practice, which is beginning to be implemented in the SEE
region. As in the other chapters, the analysis starts with the SMEs' perception of the tax system. 
5.2. SME Insights
Figure 5-1.  Perceptions of the Tax Framework
90. In common with entrepreneurs around the world, those in the SEE region voice a number of
complaints about the tax system in general, but the degree of dissatisfaction varies across countries. For
instance, Croatian entrepreneurs rated their tax system relatively better (2.3) than other SEE countries.
Moldova benefits from its innovative patent tax system. Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia also recorded rates
slightly above "poor". By contrast, Romania and Serbia are rated lowest (i.e. 1.6 or between "poor" and
"very poor"). Although Romania has a relatively modern tax regime, the poor rating may reflect the large
number of different taxes and the complexity of the tax administration. The recent elimination of a large
array of incentives targeted at small and/or new enterprises may also have affected entrepreneurs'
opinions.
91. The key problems concerning tax regimes in SEE are not so much related to their structure, but to
their implementation. Entrepreneurs highlight three main problems common to all SEE countries: the
chronic instability due to frequent and often sudden changes of the tax laws and regulations; the lack of
transparency, internal consistency and co-ordination between local and national regimes; the poor quality
of the tax administration, which is often viewed by the entrepreneurs as inefficient and inflexible, partly
because there is little consultation and training, and the high levels of corruption.  
92. Entrepreneurs in SEE evaluate tax policy as ineffective in encouraging and supporting new and
existing small enterprises. It is thus worth noting the main reasons in more detail:
• High degree of instability in the tax system: rapid and frequent changes to the structure of the taxes, their
rates, related incentives, administration, etc. 
• Tax system characterised by a high degree of complexity: the most extreme example is BiH where the two
entities (Federation and Republika Srpska) and the District of Brcko apply their own taxes and
operate their own administration. In all countries of SEE, there tend to be numerous taxes at
national, regional and local level, the frequency of payment is often high and the rules and
regulations are unclear.  
• Lack of either consultation or advance warning for proposed changes to the tax system: with some exceptions
(such as the Tripartite Councils in Romania and FYR Macedonia's draft Corporate Income Tax law),
very limited progress has been made in involving the private sector proactively in the process of
developing the tax system. 
• Poor training and advance preparation for new taxes: clear and timely information is rarely disseminated in
advance of changes. Training is provided infrequently, not just to business people, but also to the
tax administrators at national, regional and local level. The latter are, therefore, often inadequately
prepared for the changes. 
• Entrepreneurs fear the tax inspectorates: there is an excessive number of inspectorate services, such as
in Romania and FYR Macedonia, with unclear roles and responsibilities. The number of inspections
per inspectorate can be very high and the visits are typically not co-ordinated, thus imposing a
significant burden upon entrepreneurs. The rules and regulations that the inspectorates abide by
are often neither stable nor transparent. It is not uncommon for inspectorates to issue internal
memoranda on topics that should be communicated to tax-payers, but which are not made
accessible to entrepreneurs, invariably putting them on the defensive during inspections. 
• Fines and other penalties are common: the lack of transparency in the process means that the inspectors
are always able to find a reason to impose fines on enterprises and it is not unusual in certain
countries for such fines to equate fairly precisely to the tax reimbursements that are due to the
firms.
5.3. Comparative Policy Assessment
93. The basic structure of the tax regime applied to SMEs in the SEE countries does not differ
significantly from that of the OECD countries. Typically SMEs in SEE are subject to a number of taxes
based on the income generated by the business activity, such as: a) corporate income tax (CIT), b)
personal income tax levied on the value added generated or on the company turnover for individual
businesses under a certain size, c) VAT and/or sales tax on business transactions, d) property tax or land
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development tax on real estate assets owned or leased by the company, e) taxes on labour, such as social
security contributions, pension contribution, etc. and f) local taxes.
94. One result of the lack of co-ordination between local and national regimes is the multiplication 
of charges imposed on companies. Even if the overall tax burden is low, the cost of compliance for the
companies is significant. For instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a particularly complicated tax system,
whereby the entities and the District of Brcko have their own taxes (19 in all), rates, administration, 
etc. Romania also stands out as a case of multiple taxes, as companies have to deal with a total of 15
different regular tax payments, due to compulsory contributions to independently administered funds. 
The Romanian government is currently consolidating tax charges and is committed to streamlining 
the state funds. 
95. As mentioned before, a constant complaint made by entrepreneurs in SEE is that tax laws and
regulations change frequently, at short or no notice. Those changes are partly the result of the process of
upgrading and restructuring of the tax regimes. A number of changes are due to the introduction of tax
incentives, which are then followed by sudden withdrawal because they are viewed as ineffective or
unsustainable.  The uncertainty generated by these changes should be compensated for over time by the
introduction of a more stable and fairer regime.
96. An indication of the degree of instability in the tax system can be gauged by the number of changes
to corporate income tax (CIT) in the last two years (January 2001 to December 2002). All countries have
experienced at least one change, with Albania and the Federation of BiH experiencing as many as three
adjustments to CIT. When the other changes to the tax system as a whole are taken into consideration,
there is a good deal of turbulence in the tax system throughout the region.
97. However, probably the biggest problems relate to the quality and the functioning of the tax
administration. The first issue is the frequency and the timing of tax payments. For example, Serbia and
BiH require monthly payments of CIT, rather than quarterly and annual payment. In some countries
(Albania, Moldova, Romania and Croatia) a number of taxes, including CIT, have to be pre-paid, based on
the tax charges for the previous period, or an assessment made by the tax office of future profit. Frequent
tax payments with inflexible deadlines and without the possibility to compensate between tax credits and
liabilities, may seriously disrupt the cash flow of small firms. Since these firms operate with very low levels
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Table 5-1. Basic Tax System
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER
(SCG) (SCG)
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) (rate in %) 25 30 FBiH, 23.5 20 15 25 15 / 20 25 20
10-20, RS
Frequency of CIT payment Q M Q A A Q A Q M
(monthly, quarterly and annual)
Maximum Personal Income 20 Q 30 FBiH, 29 45 18 25 40 40 20
Tax (rate in %) 10 RS
Frequency of PIT payment (monthly, Q M M A M Q A M A
quarterly and annual)
Social Security Contributions 34.2 47 FBiH 32.2 17.1 18 29 20 23.3 16.3
(employer and employee) 42 RS
11.7 19.2 FBiH 10.5 20.6 15 1 20 11.7 16.3
19.5 RS
Taxes which must be pre-paid All 1 2 3 0 5 0 3 0
Changes in CIT rates and regulations 3 3 FBiH, 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
in preceding 2 years 2 RS, 1 DB
of working capital and have limited or no access to bank credit, this adds to the pressure to under-report
a company's profit and turnover. 
98. Over the last two years there have been some positive developments in tax policy in SEE. The CIT
rates in the region are relatively low by international standards (see OECD, 2003b), ranging between 10%
and 30%. The Federation of BiH has the highest rate (30%), while FYR Macedonia (15%) and Montenegro
(15-20%) have low CIT rates. Personal income tax rates (PIT) are also on a par with international standards.
The maximum level of PIT is as high as 45% in the case of Croatia, whereas it is 18% in the case of FYR
Macedonia and 10% in Republika Srpska (BiH). 
99. Several countries have introduced new taxation regimes for small enterprises and individual
entrepreneurs, such as an SME tax in Albania and the patent taxes in Albania and Moldova. The
experience of Moldova is worth noting. Individuals may purchase a temporary licence to carry out
business activities such as retailing, workshops, crafts, etc. The patent works both as a temporary business
licence as well as a form of tax pre-payment, exempting individuals from having to keep records of their
activities. The patent licence has been well received, however, once the business starts growing the usual
difficulties of obtaining licences, dealing with the tax office, coping with state inspections, etc. re-appear.
100. In order to reduce the compliance burden on small enterprises and partly in order to increase tax
collection rates, thereby stimulating a reduction in the levels of the informal economy, Croatia, Serbia,
Romania and Albania have introduced a simplified tax system. 
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Table 5-2. Tax System Measures to Promote SMEs
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Perfomance
Tax incentives for start-ups/ No No (yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
investments favouring SMEs FBIH, DB)
Simplified tax system for 
small enterprises and sole Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
proprietors
Single tax submission form No No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Internet based tax No No No No No No No No No Yes
submission
Single point of information 
on all aspects of tax for No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes
businesses
Table 5-3.  VAT / Sales Tax Features
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER OECD
(SCG) (SCG)
Type of tax VAT Sales VAT VAT VAT VAT VAT VAT Sales VAT
VAT (% & frequency)/ planned 20 A 2005 20 M 22 M 19 M 20 M 17 M 19 M 2004 31.6
date for introduction of VAT
VAT Turnover Threshold (€) 14,000 n/a 39,000 11,400 20,000 7,000 18,000 45,000 n/a n/a
VAT Refund Period (in months) n/a n/a 3 0.5 3 1.5 3 1 n/a n/a
Standard Sales Tax (%) n/a 20 FBiH, n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 20 n/a
18 RS, 
18 DB
Note: OECD data derived from OECD in Statistics (2003c)
101. Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia have introduced a single form for tax submission, as has BiH in the
case of handicrafts. None of the countries has made much progress with the possibility of allowing
Internet-based tax submissions, as is increasingly common in OECD member countries. Only a minority,
such as Bulgaria and the Republic of Montenegro, have established a single point of information for all
aspects relating to taxation for enterprises. 
102. One of the most critical issues for entrepreneurs is how the value added tax (VAT) is administered.
VAT is a neutral and universal tax, where the tax burden is shifted to the final consumer, thus avoiding
distortion of business activity. Most countries of SEE have now introduced VAT. The rates range from 22%
in the case of Croatia to 17% in the case of Montenegro. Serbia and BiH have undertaken to introduce VAT
in 2004 and 2005 respectively. A number of issues are worth highlighting with respect to experience in the
SEE region:
• VAT avoidance is still widespread throughout the SEE. For instance, in most SEE countries VAT on
imported goods is charged at customs, together with customs duties. Companies that are able to
avoid customs control or to under-report their import activity have a good chance to get away, both
with customs duty and VAT, thus acquiring a considerable price advantage vis-à-vis importers
operating according to the law, as well as towards local manufactures who have to charge VAT.       
• The thresholds for charging VAT and claiming a refund vary to a surprising degree, with Bulgaria and
Romania setting relatively high thresholds in comparison to Croatia. In most cases, VAT registration
is voluntary, thus enabling firms to pass on the costs to the final user/consumer. However, in cases
such as Bulgaria, this is not an option and may disadvantage smaller enterprises.
• The duration of the VAT refund period or the length of time firms must wait before they can reclaim
the VAT they have paid up-front for goods and services varies. The average in the SEE region is
around three months, but in Croatia it is a mere two weeks. The conditions can be stringent, 
for example in Albania, where the VAT refund can only be made if the taxpayer has carried forward
a VAT tax credit for six consecutive months and the total refund claimed exceeds 400,000 Lek (about
€3,000). In reality, the tax administration operates much more slowly than the official targets, with
entrepreneurs estimating that it typically takes twice as long. In addition to the cash flow problems
caused by this issue, the relatively high inflation rates in some countries can result in significant real
costs to enterprises and may be particularly problematic for export-oriented or capital-intensive
enterprises. 
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Chapter 6. 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS FOR FOSTERING NEW AND SMALL BUSINESSES
6.1. Introduction
103. This chapter provides an overview of the SMEs' perceptions of their ability to access finance. It
then discusses some of the issues affecting availability of finance for entrepreneurs in the SEE, providing
guidance to policy-makers as regards to actions that can be taken to improve this particular aspect of the
business environment. 
6.2. SME Insights
104. SMEs in SEE rate their access to finance slightly above the "poor" mark, except for Croatian SMEs,
which rate it "satisfactory". Croatia possesses a relatively more sophisticated banking sector compared
with the other countries of the region and this helps to explain the better rating. However, Croatia is
followed by Moldova (2.4), whose banking system is arguably weaker than in that of the other SEE
countries. Thus, the health of the banking system alone is not a sufficient explanation for the ratings given
by the SME owners and managers. Both Serbia and Montenegro rate this dimension around the "very
poor" mark. This in turn can be explained by the fact that both republics started the process of economic
transition late and are still in the initial stages of banking sector reform.
Figure 6-1.  Perceptions of Access to Finance
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105. The BEEPS (see endnote 10), also run in 2002, provides some additional interesting insights on
the problems faced by small business in relation to finance. The entrepreneurs were asked (see table 6.1)
to rate the severity of obstacles pertaining to several aspects of the business environment, including lack
of access to finance and cost of finance. The ranking of finance among all obstacles listed in the BEEPS
questionnaire indicates that perception of this aspect of the business environment is worse for the
enterprises interviewed in the BEEPS than those interviewed in the focus groups. Finance is in fact ranked
as the most severe obstacle in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro,
whereas it ranks last only in Albania and second in all other countries.
106. Financial constraints affect entry, development and growth of small enterprises all over the world.
However, because of the poor level of development of the financial sector in SEE as compared to western
economies, and because of the relatively higher risk aversion of banks in SEE, the severity of this
constraint is much stronger in this region than it is in advanced market economies, for all enterprise sizes. 
107. The 2001 European Network for SME Research (ENSR)12 ran a survey of 7,600 SMEs in 19 countries
of Western Europe (EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) through computer assisted
telephone interviews. Entrepreneurs were asked to identify from a series of listed potential obstacles the
single most important constraint to doing business. Lack of skilled labour appears to be the most
frequently (20-30% of sample) quoted "major constraint", affecting relatively more small- and medium-
sized companies than micro-sized ones. This is followed by "no obstacle at all" (15-20% of sample) and
"other obstacles than those in the list" (12-15%). Administrative regulations affect highly between 10% and
16% of enterprises in the sample and access to finance between only 8% and 15% of enterprises, with
relatively more micro enterprises isolating this as their major obstacle than enterprises of larger size. 
108. The results of the two surveys are not directly comparable in that the BEEPS enterprises were not
asked to rank the top obstacle to doing business, whereas the ENSR sample was. However, the
comparison in terms of relative importance of obstacles quoted shows finance as one of the most highly
rated obstacles in the SEE countries against a mere fifth obstacle in the 19 western European countries.
Table 6-1. Perception of Severity of Lack of Finance, Data on Availability of Finance 
and Sources Tapped by SMEs (BEEPS 2002)
Ranking Rating   Share of SMEs Of those SMEs which accessed 
of finance access to which accessed any type of finance
among all finance11 finance in total 
obstacles SMEs interviewed
Share of internal funds in Share of bank loans in 
total finance accessed total finance accessed
Working New Working New Working New
Capital Investment Capital Investment Capital Investment
Albania 5 2.5 99.3 95 89.1 87.5 3.4 4
Bosnia and 1 2.6 99 68 74.2 73.5 13.2 16
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 1 2.9 99 68 75.4 78.9 9.5 9.6
Croatia 1 2.5 92 66 59.1 52.4 14.5 21.2
FYR 2 2.4 100 73 66.9 63.9 12.4 11.2
Macedonia
Moldova 2 2.8 100 73 76.5 76.8 12.4 11.2
Romania 2 2.7 99.5 86.6 75.5 78.4 11.3 10.5
Serbia and 1 2.7 97 87 87.4 90.1 5.3 4.3
Montenegro
Source: EBRD
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109. Moreover, one can compare the extent to which entrepreneurs managed to obtain the finance
they needed, and where they found it. Table 6-1 shows that, with the exception of Croatia, most SMEs
managed to access the finance they needed for their working capital requirements, either from internal or
external sources. 
110. However, the situation for financial requirements for new investments is quite different. With the
exception of Albania, where 95% of SMEs interviewed managed to obtain funds needed to expand, only
68-78% of SMEs in the other countries of SEE managed to access funds for new investment. The
advantageous position of Albanian SMEs is well explained by the large availability of remittances. In fact
internal funds account for a far larger share of the finance accessed by Albanian SMEs than in any other
country, with the exception of Serbia where remittances are also important. Internal funds dominate by
far the sources of finance tapped by entrepreneurs, thus compensating for lack of availability of funds
from external sources. Of all external sources of finance available the most relevant is the banking sector
(differentiations by ownership of bank are not meaningful as entrepreneurs' knowledge of the ownership
structure of banks they borrow from is unreliable). Bank loans account for between 3.4% and 14.5% of
finance accessed to satisfy the working capital requirements of SMEs and for between 4% and 21.2% of
finance accessed to meet SMEs' investment needs. 
111. SMEs in all focus groups recognise that the commercial banking system is becoming more stable,
competitive and offering a wider range of services, a process which is partly connected with the
privatisation of the banking sector. Yet SMEs in the focus groups do not think that commercial banks
respond adequately to the needs of the SME sector by offering sufficient access to credit. Apart from the
usual lack of finance for start-ups, the more established SMEs are also critical of the commercial banks'
requirements. The level of interest rates and the collateral requirements for loans to small enterprises are
perceived to be unaffordable. The lack of competition among commercial banks for the small enterprise
market is another source of complaint.
112. Entrepreneurs in the region, both in the focus groups, just as those interviewed and in the BEEPS,
relied heavily on internal funds (family/friends and remittances) for starting a business. The principal
regional success story, according to entrepreneurs in the focus groups, has been the establishment and
development of microfinance institutions and in particular of microfinance banks set up by International
Financial Institutions (IFIs).  Microfinance institutions are now in operation in all countries of SEE and,
despite the fact that the loans are extended on a purely commercial basis, many entrepreneurs are happy
to accept the terms and conditions of the loans as the only alternative would be the extortionary rates
charged by moneylenders. The relatively high levels of disbursement and repayment of loans may help
send out a reassuring message to the rest of the banking industry in the SEE region, vis-à-vis the reliability
of the small enterprise sector.
113. Entrepreneurs in the focus groups, along with those interviewed in the BEEPS, have insignificant
access to non-banking external financial sources. The leasing industry is largely underdeveloped with the
exception of Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria. Venture capital funds targeting the small enterprise sector are
few and have not managed to reach sustainable investment volumes. Credit reference sources are
unheard of and credit unions are either underdeveloped or treated with caution. The lack of an adequate
legal, regulatory and supervisory framework continues to hinder diversification of the sources of finance
for the small enterprise sector. 
6.3. Comparative Policy Assessment
114. Given the unbalanced development of the financial sector in the region, with banking dominating
the sector in terms of assets and, according to the entrepreneurs interviewed, being the most important
external source of funds, the focus of the comparative policy assessment will be mostly on banking. The
question is what needs to be done to enhance the role of the banking sector in intermediating savings in
general and in providing finance for the SME sector in particular. A healthy banking sector is the key pre-
requisite for providing access to finance for SMEs. Thus this chapter initially examines the state of health
6. Financial Instruments for Fostering New and Small Businesses
42 SOUTH EAST EUROPE REGION - ENTERPRISE POLICY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT - © OECD 2003  
of the sector and its ability to intermediate savings, and then looks at how other factors can influence
either directly or indirectly the degree of bank intermediation.
115. The timing and depth of the process of reform of the banking sector and its impact on the
functioning of the sector varies widely across the countries of the Stability Pact region, but the pattern of
reform is common to all of them. Table 6-2. contains selected indicators of the reform process. The
countries of the SEE region, as all other transition countries, inherited from the previous regimes banking
systems that were structurally unable to efficiently intermediate savings. 
116. Transition to a market economy involved in the early stages of transition dismantling the inherited
mono-bank system and the creation of an independent central bank and of a separate tier of state-owned
commercial banks. This step was followed by the clean-up of the bad loans of the commercial banks
usually through a recapitalisation process and the privatisation of the commercial banks, usually through
direct sale to a foreign strategic investor, who possessed the relevant know-how and could improve
corporate governance and provide the necessary capital. Both privatisation and the entry of foreign
strategic shareholders in the SEE banks stimulated recapitalisation and restructuring of the sector. At the
same time the legal and regulatory framework for the banking sector was set up and gradually improved
to ensure efficient entry and exit in the sector, effective regulation and supervision and the provision of
an expanded range of financial services on offer. 
117. Foreign ownership resulted in stronger capitalisation, improved banking practices, higher
profitability, increased competition (as evidenced by decreasing spreads between lending and deposit rates)
but also increased risk aversion. Increased risk aversion de facto implied reduced lending activity. When and
where the growth of bank lending resumed, the beneficiaries of this activity were mainly low risk segments of
the economy: large foreign-owned companies, local blue chip companies and households. Entry of foreign
investors was universally linked to a rapid increase of retail banking (i.e. loans to households). Thus although
banking reform is a prerequisite for efficient intermediation of savings, it alone by no means guarantees in
the short-medium term that enterprise access to official financial sources is improved.
118. Despite the profound transformation undergone by the banking systems of the countries in the
region, the level of banking intermediation is still low (in 2002 domestic credit averaged about 30.6% of
GDP in the SEE area, as compared to 135% in the Euro area), and in particular domestic credit to the
private sector is even lower at an average of 21.7% of GDP in the region in 2002, as compared with 113%
in the Euro area (in 2001). The level of domestic credit to private sector in relation to GDP is low, not only
as compared to the average of the EU countries, but also compared to that of countries at a similar level
Table 6-2. Indicators of Banking Sector Reform
2002 Share of assets of banks Share of assets of banks Share of non-performing EBRD index of banking 
with more than 50% with more than 50% loans in total bank reform and interest rate 
state ownership in total foreign ownership in total loans (%) liberalisation13
assets of banks (%) assets of banks (%)
Albania 54.1 45.9 5.6 2+
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.24 76.7 11.5 2+
Bulgaria 14.1 75.2 10.4 3+
Croatia 4.0 90.2 11.5 4-
FYR Macedonia 1.9 44.0 35.7 3
Moldova 13.4 36.7 7.6 2+
Romania 43.6 52.9 2.3 3-
Serbia and Montenegro 35.6 27.0 28.5 2+
Source: EBRD and IMF
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of development as approximated by GDP per capita. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a
positive correlation between privatisation and the degree of bank intermediation to the private sector
and an even stronger one between foreign ownership and bank intermediation to the private sector. Yet,
given the low levels of domestic credit to the private sector in relation to GDP, privatisation and foreign
ownership are necessary but not sufficient conditions for making bank finance more accessible to the
private sector.
119. The low levels of bank intermediation are partly a consequence of the severe recession
experienced by all SEE countries in the first years of transition. The economic downturn led to the
accumulation of bad loans in the banks' portfolios. The subsequent clean-up of banks' portfolios in
advance of privatisation then led to a significant reduction in the assets of the banking sector (the most
notable example was Bulgaria, where banking sector assets dropped from 350% of GDP in 1991 to 34% in
1997).  In some cases the accumulation of bad loans and/or exogenous shocks led to banking crises, which
further shrank bank loan portfolios. As a reaction to banking sector crises, more stringent banking
regulations and supervisory practices were introduced and this induced more prudent lending behaviour.
Even in the absence of banking crises, more risk-averse behaviour always followed privatisation to foreign
owners. Table 6-3. also shows how much faster credit to households is increasing than bank credit to
enterprises in the region (with the exceptions of Albania and Bulgaria). In FYR Macedonia and Serbia and
Montenegro domestic credit to the enterprise sector has actually been decreasing in the past three years.
It will take decades for the market alone to reach the levels of intermediation observed in western
countries. For this reason corrective measures need to be undertaken.
120. The simplest way to speed up the provision of finance to the small enterprise sector is that of
creating banking channels entirely dedicated to that activity. The experience of microfinance banks in the
region has been excellent in terms of outreach to the smallest and poorest. Table 6-4. shows the very large
number of loans of very small size in each country in which a microfinance bank or institution is set up.
The low arrears signify that the loans extended are of good quality: a pre-requisite for commercial viability
and maximum recyclability of funds. To a lesser extent, a significant contribution to the provision of
finance to a slightly larger segment of the enterprise sector has come from dedicated credit lines. Table
6-5. contains summary statistics for a selection of dedicated SME credit lines financed by the joint 
co-operation of EU and EBRD. The average loan size is larger than that of the microfinance institutions and
the number of loans is smaller. NGO activity has complemented the former two types of programmes 
by making finance available to those who would never manage to access bank finance (e.g. start-ups, 
or enterprises in areas devoid of bank branches). 
Table 6-3. Domestic Credit
Domestic credit Domestic Credit  Cumulative growth Cumulative growth Cumulative growth 
in % of GDP, to Private sector rate of bank credit  rate of bank credit rate of bank credit 
2002 in % of GDP, to private sector, to entreprises, to households, 
2002 2000-02 2000-02 2000-02
Albania 44.9 6.8 99 147 -46
Bosnia and 34.8 38.2 93.8 45.6 248
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 25.2 18.7 101.7 111 73.5
Croatia 63.8 55.8 32.1 9.9 75.9
FYR Macedonia 18.2 16.4 -7.5 -12.8 67.4
Moldova 29.9 17.5 n/a n/a n/a
Romania 13.4 8.4 7.2 4.5 48.7
Serbia and 14.5 15.4 -60.2 -63.8 135.5
Montenegro
Source: EBRD, IMF and Cottarelli et al (2003)
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121. The legal and regulatory environment is, however, not always conducive to the establishment and
development of these three types of programmes. In some cases, the excessive tightness and rigidity of
the legal and regulatory regime restrict lending to the smallest borrowers. For example in Serbia the NGO
channel is ruled out - no institution without a banking license is allowed to lend money. In Moldova a very
high minimum capital requirement and the legal impossibility of transferring a portfolio of loans from one
institution to another with the same or related owners precludes the transformation of micro-finance
institutions into micro-finance banks, thus making them perennially dependent on donor funding. 
122. In most countries, minimum capital requirements are applied uniformly across the banking sector,
without any variation to reflect the nature of the financial institution in question. High loan loss provisioning
requirements and restrictive definitions of acceptable collateral in Bulgaria can limit the activity of a
microfinance bank, if rigidly enforced. Albanian banking legislation14 specifies minimum criteria for assessing
credit risk that make the provisioning levels for many micro-loans disproportionately high in comparison
with the actual risk undertaken by the bank. Luckily the implementation of these stringent regulations in
Albania and Bulgaria is relatively flexible and, therefore, the activity of the local micro-finance banks is not
de facto hindered by the regulatory system. In other cases the legal and regulatory regime may be too lax.
In FYR Macedonia, for example, it was suggested that regulations on the shareholding structure of banks
(including stricter eligible criteria for banks' shareholders) and related party transactions should be
tightened, in order to prevent improper interference in banks' business by shareholders. 
Table 6-4. Microfinance Banks and Institutions in Operation at December 2002
December Name Start date Total number Total volume Average Loan Arrears % 
2002 of loans issued of loans issued, outstanding, over 30 days
US$ US$
Albania FEFAD Albania Jan-96 12,430 80,654,495 5,479 1.98%
Bosnia and MEB Bosnia Nov-97 15,652 78,169,568 5,376 0.55%
Herzegovina
Bulgaria ProCredit Oct-01 6,827 42,906.933 5,930 0.03%
Bulgaria
Moldova MEC Moldova Dec-99 2,304 11,036,695 3,766 0.00%
Romania MIRO Romania Jan-00 3,472 19,043,959 4,087 0.54%
Serbia and MFB Yugoslavia Apr-01 5,973 49,419,438 6,788 0.46%
Montenegro
Source: EBRD
Table 6-5. Selected Dedicated Credit Lines Financed by EU/EBRD in Operation at December 2002
December Name Start date Total number of Total volume of Average Loan, 
2002 loans issued loans issued, US$ US$
Bulgaria Union Bank Jul-00 950 19,079,286 20,083
Bulgaria Hebros Bank Sept-01 297 8,008,320 26,964
Bulgaria Raiffeisen Bank May-02 47 734,131 15,620
Romania Alpha Bank Dec-99 79 3,079,769 38,984
Romania Banca Transilvania Jan-01 343 15,019,224 43,788
Romania Romanian May-02 518 27,602,243 53,286
Commercial Bank
Romania Banca Agricola May-02 3 25,906 8,635
Raiffeisen
Romania Bank Post May-02 45 1,040,603 23,125
Romania Volksbank May-02 10 383,898 38,390
Source: EBRD
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123. The pressing challenge in the legal regime is finding the delicate balance between prudential
regulation of the banking system and a flexible framework facilitating microfinance activities.  In some
cases changes to facilitate lending to the smallest businesses have already taken place. FYR Macedonia
for example has passed a special Law on Microfinancing Banks, whose provisions on the minimum capital
requirements take precedence over conflicting provisions of the country's Banking Law. In Romania,
banking legislation on assessing credit risk and the corresponding provisioning levels to be applied,
failed to incorporate the specific features of micro-lending. However, after lengthy discussions, the
National Bank of Romania has recently agreed to authorise the EBRD-sponsored Microfinance Bank to
rate all loans under €10,000 in the top category, thus requiring minimal provisioning.
124. The generally weak and underdeveloped banking sector in the region has produced severe
financial crises, which have motivated central banks to impose stringent regulatory requirements on
financial institutions. While the consolidation and strengthening of the banking system is a laudable
objective, microfinance operations have often suffered, due to an inflexible regulatory environment that
inhibits their expansion and makes their long-term sustainability a precarious task. Designing the optimal
legal regime for maintaining a healthy banking system responsive to the needs of small businesses
requires active dialogue among government officials, policy makers and those multilateral financial
institutions that provide technical assistance in the region.
125. Other aspects of the regulatory environment affect the ability of financial institutions to effectively
intermediate savings. In particular, land reform has produced mixed results in the region with delays in
developing land registries and functioning cadastres. This has precluded firms from using real estate as
collateral in their efforts to access bank finance. Legal reform to enforce contractual obligations and their
implementation have been uneven and rarely satisfactory. As a consequence banks tend to require
excessive levels of collateral as they find it risky, if not impossible, to collect when a loan is not repaid.
Finally, accounting standards are still inadequate, thus precluding banks from accessing the necessary
information from would-be borrowers. Although these aspects of the regulatory environment do not at
first sight appear to have a particular influence on the SME sector, they in fact weigh heavily on the ability
of enterprises to borrow from official channels. Advances in land reform, improvements in the
enforcement of contractual obligations and in raising accounting standards are necessary to indirectly
improve the access of SMEs to commercial sources of finance.
126. The role of the state in the banking sector has dramatically reduced over the past decade. However,
despite the fact that the share of assets of banks with majority state ownership in total bank assets is now
relatively low in the region at 27% (see table 6-2.), there are constant attempts by governments in the region
to support the small enterprise sector through direct provision of finance to the sector, in order to correct
what are perceived as market failures in credit allocation. Therefore, the concept of a well-functioning private
financial sector being more efficient than a state-run financial sector does not yet appear to be ingrained in
the regional culture. Examples of direct state intervention in this field include the numerous state guarantee
funds and state-run programmes to provide subsidised finance to small businesses. 
127. However, the experience of both OECD and transition countries shows that the state, through its
network of civil servants, is generally unable to select the best among the pool of small borrowers. In
addition leaving the decision to allocate subsidised loans to the discretion of politicians and civil servants
in the absence of market mechanisms that would penalise the finance providers for taking the wrong
lending decisions, creates plenty of room for political patronage and possibly corruption. It could be
argued that, in order to counterbalance the lack of credit skills and limit political influence, the state could
contract to the private sector the management of state supported lending schemes and guarantee funds.
Yet there are several reasons why this would be problematic to implement. In most of the SEE countries
the current legal framework does not allow to entrust to management of state-funds to truly independent
managers and some form of political control has to remain in place. Even if this obstacle is overcome, an
effective monitoring and reporting system should be introduced in order to avoid the mismanagement of
state funds. Ideally, in order to gain independence, the private managers should be able to finance
themselves out of fees alone, rather than government funds. 
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128. There is finally a fundamental issue concerning the provision of credit guarantees by the state.
Shifting the risk balance from the commercial banks to the state will in the short term help to increase the
loan volume, but over the medium term may slow down or even reverse the development of a sound
banking sector. Guarantees per se relax the behaviour of banks. At a point in transition when banks are
on the steep part of the learning curve in terms of using appropriate lending methodologies and
evaluating risk correctly, the state is de facto inviting them to take it easy by offering a guarantee in case
the loan is not repaid, and may encourage the application of lax credit assessment procedures by
commercial banks. Unfortunately there have been many examples of state sponsored guarantee schemes
which ended up creating large liabilities for the commercial banks and ultimately for the government,
pushing away the prospects of sustainability of provision of finance to SMEs. In order to ensure an
efficient market mechanism for direct provision of finance to SMEs, the role of the state in the direct
intermediation of savings should be minimal.
129. There are of course exceptions but these are few and well identified. The first is the case of start-
ups, never considered as potential clients by official financial institutions. In that case, should a
government want to stimulate entry into the sector, alongside improvements in the administrative 
and regulatory structure for setting up businesses, it could provide guarantees for those would-be
entrepreneurs that lack the initial start-up funds. The second case is that of guarantee funds set up by
groups of private entrepreneurs, mutual guarantee funds. These are common in Western Europe and have
served over the years as an essential tool to provide finance to SMEs and lower the banks' perception of
the risk associated with small businesses. Historically, they were set up through guilds and other business
associations. In transition countries where this tradition is missing, the state could play a key role in
stimulating the establishment of such financial structures. In the initial phase the state could even
consider contributing to the capital, but the mutual element should remain dominant. 
NOTES
11. The scores can be interpreted as follows: 1 = no obstacle; 2 = minor obstacle; 3 = moderate obstacle;
4 = major obstacle.
12.  European Commission (2002b), Observatory of European SMEs n.1: Highlights from the 2001 Survey.
13. Scale: 1 = little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system to 4+ = standards and
performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking laws and regulations
with the standards of the Bank for International Standards; provision of full set of competitive banking
services. 
14. Article 5.2 of the Albanian Regulation on Credit Risk Management approved by Decision of the
Supervisory Council [of the Bank of Albania] no. 13, 21.02.2001.
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Chapter 7. 
ADVISORY SERVICES FOR NEW AND SMALL BUSINESSES
7.1. Introduction
130. Potential entrepreneurs looking to become self-employed or start up a new company frequently
do not have very clear knowledge of what is involved in registering, financing, expanding and managing
an enterprise. In this context, the availability of information and advice to potential and new enterprises
can be of crucial importance to their survival, development and success in generating economic growth,
employment and wealth. 
131. Business advice for start-ups and young enterprises is particularly important for development of
the enterprise sector. One common area of market failure is that of provision of information to potential
and new entrepreneurs, particularly in transition economies. Therefore, in assessing enterprise
performance, it is important to analyse the extent to which business advisory services are available and
well-functioning.
7.2. SME Insights
132. Small enterprise managers and owners rate the access to business advisory services higher than
the other five dimensions of the business environment assessed in this regional report. In Bulgaria,
Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia the ratings were close to or above the "satisfactory" level, although this
Figure 7-1.  Perceptions of Business Advisory Services
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does not necessarily mean that entrepreneurs consider these services to be adequate and appropriate
to their needs, as illustrated below.
133. Entrepreneurs are quite concerned about what they consider to be a lack of sufficient support to
start-ups and newly established enterprises. Although their principal feedback was on the lack of sufficient
tax and financial incentives and subsidies to assist the sector, notwithstanding the above generally
satisfactory ratings, there is still a perception that there is a general lack of business information, data and
support. Where this support does exist, it is viewed by entrepreneurs as being concentrated in and around
the capital city and/or unaffordable for small enterprises.
134. Much international and donor effort has gone into raising the human capital and capacity of the
advisors in the Business Advisory Centres (BACs) that have been established in all countries of SEE. The
skills, experience and quality of the BAC staff are generally considered to be quite good, but could be
enhanced through, for example, greater first-hand experience of working with local enterprises. The state-
provided advisory services delivered through regional, country and local authorities are generally
considered by entrepreneurs as being not up to their standards and expectations. By contrast, private
sector providers, such as consultancies and training specialists are rated better by the entrepreneurs. The
main private sector networks in the SEE region are the Chambers of Commerce, however, representatives
of small enterprises also tend to be unenthusiastic about the services offered by these organisations. 
135. Entrepreneurs are increasingly looking for services which go beyond the basics (e.g. business
planning, applications for credit, training, etc.) to advice and analysis capable of adding real value to their
operations (e.g. quality assurance and control, EU standards for exports, efficient production methods,
targeted market research, etc.). There is little evidence that BACs are responding sufficiently quickly to
the range of services that are increasingly demanded. As a consequence, there remains an underlying
reluctance among entrepreneurs to use business advisory services unless these are provided at no cost
or at a subsidised rate. If SME owners and managers begin to perceive greater value-added for their
operations, they may become more willing to engage BACs and other business service providers in future.
7.3. Comparative Policy Assessment
136. In the absence of market provision at affordable rates in the SEE region IFIs, international
organisations and bilateral donor agencies have taken the lead in establishing BACs focusing on start-ups
and young firms through free or subsidised business advice and services. The number of BACs per 1,000
small enterprises is an indication of the degree of provision of such services. These vary from a relatively
high proportion in Moldova (1.3 per 1,000) and Albania (0.9 per 1,000) to very little in Montenegro,
Bulgaria and Romania. 
Table 7-1.  Advisory Service Benchmarks of Good Performance
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Business Advisory Centres 50 25 24 21 12 25 8 50 34 Yes
BACs per 1,000  SMEs 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 n/a
Professional bodies issuing No No No No No No No No No Yes
accreditation in this sector
Regional Development 10 2 33 6 6 0 0 8 15 Yes
Agencies 
Science / Technology Parks 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 Yes
Euro Information 0 1 8 1 0 1 1 8 1 Yes
Correspondence Centres
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137. There is a continuing expectation that BACs will become financially sustainable within a relatively
short period of 2-3 years. Experience shows, however, that potential entrepreneurs and small enterprises
rarely have the financial resources (or willingness) to provide BACs with the regular financial income
stream necessary to maintain and expand their operations. The consequence is that once subsidies dry
up, BACs either close down or seek to diversify their activities to enterprises more able to pay commercial
fees, such as larger and more established enterprises. The issue of financial sustainability continues to be
of overriding importance in every country that is endowed with BACs or other similar initiatives.
138. None of the countries in the SEE region has established professional qualifications and
accreditation in relation to business advisory services, such as Certified Management Consultant (CMC)
status, an internationally recognised certification by the International Council of Management Consulting
Institutes (ICMCI), although Croatia had a certification body and FYR Macedonia intends to establish one.
This is a response to the fact that entrepreneurs remain critical of the range, quality, cost and value-added
of using the business advisory services currently on offer. Without a much greater focus on internationally
recognised qualifications and accreditation, it is unlikely that BACs will secure financial sustainability and
be independent of state budgets. 
139. Countries that are slightly more advanced in the process of transition demonstrate decreasing
levels of reliance on BAC-type arrangements, or indeed the Chamber of Commerce networks. Bulgaria and
Romania are beginning to establish their own business support organisations. These are voluntary
organisations totally focused around the needs of the small enterprise sector. An example of a successful
initiative of this nature is the National Council for Private SMEs in Romania, which represents over 55,000
SMEs through over 70 branches dedicated to promoting the needs of the small enterprise sector in
Romania and abroad. Greater self-reliance rather than donor led services should be the goal.
140. Other forms of activity designed to stimulate entrepreneurship and economic growth, such 
as Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and Euro-Info Centres, are rapidly becoming established in
the SEE region. Whilst the BACs typically focus on start-ups and young small enterprises, RDAs tend to
concentrate on regional and economic development more generally. In anticipation of large scale regional
structural funds upon entry in the EU, Romania and Bulgaria have established RDA networks with a strong
SME development dimension, since fairly substantial SME-oriented funds are already provided by the
pre-accession/Phare instruments and are expected to increase upon accession. Other countries, such as
Albania, have witnessed a re-branding of BACs into RDAs, partly as a survival strategy. BiH has already
established two RDAs and several others are in the pipeline, suggesting a trend in the region.
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Chapter 8. 
BUSINESS INCUBATORS: SUPPORT TO START-UPS
8.1. Introduction
141. Business incubators have become an increasingly popular policy instrument for economic and
employment development in OECD member countries. Recent studies suggest that today there are over
4,000 business incubators in operation throughout the world. Incubation is essentially about providing
fertile conditions in order to foster new business ideas, innovation in encouraging entrepreneurial spirit
and practical steps in providing the environment and facilities to ensure implementation of action.
Incubators can help to tackle many challenges faced by all countries that aspire to build the SME sector,
such as: how to stimulate new enterprise and the rate of new company start-up; how to support early stage
businesses and enable them to survive and grow; how to promote more local and regional development;
and how to nurture technology development and the application of academic research.  
142. Box 8-1. highlights some main features of business incubators. OECD member countries have
utilised incubators in a wide variety of ways. In addition to the objectives outlined below, incubators have
sometimes been developed in response to industrial restructuring through plant closures or
technological obsolescence and in partnerships with local communities and major companies. They have
also been used to promote enterprise in minority, social and ethnic groups where the level of
entrepreneurship has been seen as inadequate. In brief, the range and scope of incubators has been wide
and innovative in its application and this trend continues today in many transition economies.
143. The primary focus of most business incubators has been to provide new and young developing
firms with premises, infrastructure and a range of services and support that can improve their ability to
survive and establish their operations during the early developmental period. The combined features of
Box 8-1. Business Incubators in OECD Member Countries 
"There are now around 50 incubators in Australia, and some 200 incubator type institutions in France. In
Germany approximately 200 incubators offer premises for some 5,000 companies and 200 research
institutions. Over 100 incubator schemes of different sorts operate throughout the United Kingdom, and
there are estimated to be at least 550 incubators in the United States. The European Business Innovation
Network has created a network of some 120 Business Innovation Centres (BICs) throughout the European
Union, the majority of which also perform a business incubation function…The underlying objectives of
business incubation programmes are similarly diverse. These objectives have included: combating
unemployment by means of enterprise creation and improved rates of survival; redressing local and regional
economic decline; nurturing a climate conducive to entrepreneurship; expanding the supply of
infrastructure; providing a nursery for the commercialisation of university research (especially through
technology incubators); upgrading the technological capabilities of firms in a given location; fostering the
development of specific industries and technologies; and even affording a safe haven for legitimate
entrepreneurship in areas where crime is a constraint on business." OECD (1999)
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good physical facilities, focus on start-ups and SMEs and availability of "soft" advisory and support
services are what distinguish business incubators from industrial centres or parks (OECD-UNIDO, 1999,
pp.51-53). Business people tend to find incubators attractive since they can assist in reducing business
barriers in transition economies by pooling know-how and lowering fixed costs.
8.2. SME Insights
144. The ratings given by entrepreneurs to business incubators in South East Europe are highly
variable. They approach the "satisfactory" level (rating: 3.0) in Croatia and Bulgaria, both countries with
fairly extensive experience of business incubators. The Albanian and BiH situation with low ratings is
quite different. There are a few of them, with specific remits (such as returning displaced persons in the
case of BiH), and they are generally poorly equipped. In general it is clear from the EPPA research that
SEE countries are not adequately aware of the potential of business incubators and have not used them
constructively or creatively to the extent that OECD and many developing countries have.
145. Despite extensive use and documented case experience with business incubators in OECD
member countries, entrepreneurs in SEE, as a rule, know little about business incubators. Although
incubators have been established in the region for 6-10 years, very little information has been
disseminated on their potential for support to business, entry rules, effectiveness, best practice, etc.
Nevertheless, the EPPA research also shows that once entrepreneurs understand what incubators are
about, they regard them as offering a great deal of potential in enhancing the survival prospects of newly
established enterprises. They see the common support services provided by incubators as being
particularly useful in the SEE context, where the legal and regulatory barriers, access to suitable real
estate, etc. are particularly difficult to come to terms with, and affect the survival rate of newly established
enterprises.
146. Entrepreneurs are typically unaware of the existence of government policy in relation to fostering
business incubators in their respective countries. There is also a lack of understanding and implementation
of good governance principles in relation to entrance and exit criteria, operating conditions, services,
charges, etc. 
Figure 8-1.  Perceptions of the Business Incubator Framework15
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8.3. Comparative Policy Assessment
147. There is relatively little data on business incubators in SEE. With the exception of Montenegro,
every country in the SEE region has some experience of business incubators. Croatia, Bulgaria, FYR
Macedonia and Romania are the best endowed. The great majority of business incubators were
established in the 1990s, but some have been terminated in the meantime. Fewer have been created
since 2000, although all the countries in SEE aspire to establish more of them in the near future.
148. Incubators typically require a certain minimum amount of space (2,000 - 4,000m²), tenants (20-30)
and occupancy rate (85%) to be viable and have the prospect of being financially sustainable, but the
business incubators in the SEE region operate well below these broad benchmarks. Only the Romanian
incubators approach the minimum threshold in terms of size. Although the BiH business incubator
complies with the benchmark for the minimum size and number of tenants, the others lie far below. Only
the Bulgarian and Croatian business incubators approach the occupancy rate benchmark. With the
exception of Moldova, all other countries for which there is information comply with the benchmark of a
tenancy period of 36 months. The survival rate of tenanted enterprises varies from 93% in the case of BiH
to 75% in the case of Romania. The relatively low survival rate of tenanted firms in Romania may be part
of the reason why only five of the 10 business incubators that were originally created continue to be
viable.
149. Based on the limited data available, the business incubators in the SEE region do not appear to
have the capacity to become financially sustainable in the near future. Part of the reason for this is that
donors and IFIs have tended to treat business incubators as an element of the process of reducing the
impact of state owned enterprise restructuring and/or closure, which means that they typically have 
a poverty mitigation focus, rather than focusing on individuals/enterprises with high growth potential 
and a long term perspective. While recognising the importance of the former, there equally needs to be
a greater focus on the latter, so as to develop sustainable incubators, which harness the skills of ambitious
and innovative entrepreneurs. 
150. There also appears to be a very limited focus on developing links and joint ventures with
universities and research institutes as a means of capitalising on R&D, thus capturing the benefits of
innovation. The SEE region benefits from having a relatively large proportion of well trained and highly
Table 8-1.  Business Incubator Benchmarks of Good Performance16
Benchmarks
AL BiH BG HR MK MD MON RO17 SER of Good
(SCG) (SCG) Performance
Number of business 2 1 8 11 8 2 0 5 0 n/a
incubators
% of operating costs n/a 0 n/a 80% n/a 0 - 0 - 25%
from public subsidies
Incubator space at or n/a Yes No No n/a n/a - No - 2,000-4,000
above benchmark (m²) (6,800) (1,000) (1,025) (1,750)
Number of incubator n/a Yes No No No n/a - No - 20-30
tenants at or above (26) (10) (8) (12)
benchmark
Incubator occupancy rate n/a No No Yes No n/a - No - 85%
at or above benchmark (%) (80%) (85%) (65%)
Maximum tenancy (months) 36 60 36 n/a 36 24 - 36 - 36
Survival rate of tenanted n/a 93% n/a n/a n/a n/a - 75% - 85%
firms (%)
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qualified engineers, software programmers, scientists, etc. which business incubators could target.
However, this is rarely the focus of business incubators in the SEE region and in some countries, such as
in Serbia, academics are actually debarred from participating in this type of initiative.
NOTES
15. Ratings for Serbia and Montenegro are not given as they had yet to implement business incubators
(with the exception of Belgrade, where a private sector operator has taken the lead in establishing a
technology incubator) at the time of the EPPA research.
16. Benchmarks derived from DG Enterprise (2002b) Benchmarking for Business Incubators; and from
the OECD LEED Programme good practice experience with business incubators in OECD member
countries.
17. A 2003 survey by the National Agency for SMEs suggests that 18 business incubators were in existence,
however, as of December 2002, five were known of.
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Annex 1. 
EUROPEAN CHARTER FOR SMALL ENTERPRISES
(adopted by the General Affairs Council, 13 June 2000,
and welcomed by the Feira European Council, 19/20 June 2000)
Small enterprises are the backbone of the European economy.  They are a key source of jobs and a
breeding ground for business ideas. Europe's efforts to usher in the new economy will succeed only if
small business is brought to the top of the agenda.
Small enterprises are the most sensitive of all to changes in the business environment.  They are the
first to suffer if weighed down with excessive bureaucracy.  And they are the first to flourish from initiatives
to cut red tape and reward success.
At Lisbon we set the goal for the European Union to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion.
Small enterprises must be considered as a main driver for innovation, employment as well as social
and local integration in Europe.
The best possible environment for small business and entrepreneurship needs therefore to be created.
Principles
In urging for this, we
• Acknowledge the dynamic capacities of small enterprises in answering to new market needs and in
providing jobs;
• Stress the importance of small enterprises in fostering social and regional development, while
behaving as examples of initiative and commitment;
• Recognise entrepreneurship as a valuable and productive life skill, at all levels of responsibility;
• Applaud successful enterprise, which deserves to be fairly rewarded;
• Consider that some failure is concomitant with responsible initiative and risk-taking and must be
mainly envisaged as a learning opportunity;
• Recognise the values of knowledge, commitment and flexibility in the new economy.
The situation of small business in the European Union can be improved by action to stimulate
entrepreneurship, to evaluate existing measures, and when necessary, to make them small-business-
friendly, and to ensure that policy-makers take due consideration of small business needs. To this end,
we pledge ourselves to:
• Strengthen the spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship which enables European business to face
the challenges ahead;
• Achieve a regulatory, fiscal and administrative framework conducive to entrepreneurial activity and
improve the status of entrepreneurs;
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• Ensure access to markets on the basis of the least burdensome requirements that are consistent
with overriding public policy objectives;
• Facilitate access to the best research and technology;
• Improve access to finance throughout the entire life-cycle of an enterprise;
• Improve our performance continuously, so that the EU will offer the best environment for small
business in the world;
• Listen to the voice of small business;
• Promote top-class small business support.
Lines for action
By endorsing this Charter, we commit ourselves to work along the following lines for action, taking due
consideration of small business needs.
1. Education and training for entrepreneurship
Europe will nurture entrepreneurial spirit and new skills from an earlier age. General knowledge about
business and entrepreneurship needs to be taught at all school levels. Specific business-related modules
should be made an essential ingredient of education schemes at secondary level and at colleges and
universities.
We will encourage and promote youngsters' entrepreneurial endeavours, and develop appropriate
training schemes for managers in small enterprises.
2. Cheaper and faster start-up
The costs of companies' start-up should evolve towards the most competitive in the world. Countries
with the longest delays and most burdensome procedures for approving new companies should be
encouraged to catch up with the fastest. Online access for registration should be increased.
3. Better legislation and regulation
National bankruptcy laws should be assessed in the light of good practice. The learning from
benchmarking exercises should lead us to the improvement of current practices in the EU.
New regulations at national and Community level should be screened to assess their impact on small
enterprises and entrepreneurs. Wherever possible, national and EC rules should be simplified. Governments
should adopt user-friendly administrative documents.
Small enterprises could be exempted from certain regulatory obligations. In this context, the
Commission could simplify competition legislation to reduce the burden of compliance for small business. 
4. Availability of skills
We shall endeavour to ensure that training institutions, complemented by in-house training schemes,
deliver an adequate supply of skills adapted to the needs of small business, and provide lifetime training
and consultancy.
5. Improving online access
Public authorities should be urged to increase their electronic communication with the small
business sector. Thus, companies will be able to receive advice, make applications, file tax returns or
obtain simple information online, therefore faster and more cheaply. The Commission must lead by
example in this area.
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6. More out of the Single Market
Small businesses are feeling the benefits from the reforms underway of Europe's economy. The
Commission and Member States must therefore pursue the reforms underway aiming at the completion
in the Union of a true internal market, user-friendly for small business, in critical areas for development of
small businesses including electronic commerce, telecommunications, utilities, public procurement and
cross-border payment systems.
At the same time, European and national competition rules should be vigorously applied to make sure
that small businesses have every chance to enter new markets and compete on fair terms.
7. Taxation and financial matters
Tax systems should be adapted to reward success, encourage start-ups, favour small business
expansion and job creation, and facilitate the creation and the succession in small enterprises. Member
States should apply best practice to taxation and to personal performance incentives.
Entrepreneurs need finance to translate ambitions into reality. In order to improve the access of small
enterprises to financial services, we will:
• Identify and remove barriers to the creation of a pan-European capital market and to the
implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan and the Risk Capital Action Plan;
• Improve the relationship between the banking system and small enterprises by creating
appropriate access conditions to credit and to venture capital;
• Improve the access to the structural funds and welcome initiatives by the European Investment
Bank to increase funding available to start-ups and high-technology enterprises, including equity
instruments.
8. Strengthen the technological capacity of small enterprises
We will strengthen existing programmes aimed at promoting technology dissemination towards small
enterprises as well as the capacity of small business to identify, select and adapt technologies.
We will foster technology co-operation and sharing among different company sizes and particularly
between European small enterprises, develop more effective research programmes focussed on the
commercial application of knowledge and technology, and develop and adapt quality and certification
systems to small enterprises. It is important to ensure that a Community patent is available and easily
accessible to small enterprises.
We will foster the involvement of small enterprises in inter-firm co-operation, at local, national,
European and international levels as well as the co-operation between small enterprises and higher
education and research institutions. 
Actions at national and regional levels aimed at developing inter-firm clusters and networks should
therefore be supported, pan-European co-operation between small enterprises using information
technologies enhanced, best practice in co-operative agreements spread, and small enterprises co-
operation supported to improve their capabilities to enter pan-European markets and to extend their
activities in third country markets.
9. Successful e-business models and top-class small business support
The Commission and Member States should encourage small enterprises to apply best practice and
adopt successful business models that enable them to truly flourish in the new economy.
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We will co-ordinate Member States and EU activity to create information and business support
systems, networks and services which are easy to access and understand, and relevant to the needs of
business; ensure EU-wide access to guidance and support from mentors and business angels, including
through websites, and exploit the European Observatory on SMEs.
10. Develop stronger, more effective representation of small enterprises' interests at Union and national level
We will complete a review of how the interests of small businesses are represented at EU and national
level, including through the social dialogue.
We commit ourselves to progress towards these goals using the open method of co-ordination of
national enterprise policies. The Multi-annual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship, the
Cardiff process on economic reforms, the Luxembourg process on employment policies and other
Community programs and initiatives will be used to this end. We will monitor and evaluate progress
annually on the basis of a Commission report on the relevant issues at the Spring Summits.
We will use effective indicators to assess progress over time and in relation to the best in the world to
reinforce our learning, searching for better practice in all fields that affect small business to continuously
improve our performance. 
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Annex 2.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I. The EPPA methodology has been designed to provide insights and assessments of the performance
in the implementation of policies to improve the investment environment for businesses. The EPPAs
have been conducted on a standard basis in all countries of the region and provide a benchmark for
(a) highlighting key reform issues (b) measuring private sector insights and assessments of the
business environment (c) assessing progress on a country by country basis and (d) comparative cross-
country review for the SEE region.
II. The main components of the country EPPAs, on which this regional analysis builds, are as follows:
• A template of questions derived from extensive case study work on good practice in transition
economies and OECD country experience (OECD-UNIDO, 1999) was used in the qualitative
discussions.
• Country-based experts/consultants were selected for their enterprise policy knowledge and
experience. They undertook the research, collected the information and produced the first draft of
the country EPPAs.
• Focus group research: group discussions were held with SME representatives in each country, based
on the template of questions. Over 250 firms participated.
• Individual SME interviews were carried out to validate the focus group research and to provide
further insights on key issues.
• Expert interviews were undertaken in order to cross-reference the information from the focus
groups, contribute to views and deepen the analysis.
• Desk research was carried out to complement the qualitative research (existing reports, databases,
strategies, laws, etc.).
• International perspectives on good practice were incorporated by utilising expertise from OECD,
EBRD as well as policy experts from OECD member countries.
III. Under the guidance of OECD, the focus group research with the SME owners and managers was carried
out by local consultants in the eight countries of the Stability Pact (the regional analysis separates
Serbia and Montenegro for SME policy reasons, thus resulting in nine country EPPA reports) using a
structured brief and template of questions developed by OECD and EBRD. The focus group research
took place through the second half of 2002. 
IV. Generally, three focus group discussions were organised in each country. The locations included the
capital city, an economically dynamic area and an economically depressed area in order to capture a
range of economic scenarios. Four focus groups were held in BiH, reflecting its administrative
specificities, and five in the case of Romania, reflecting the size of the country in comparison with the
other countries in the SEE region participating in the exercise. 
V. The following sectors of activity were typically represented in the focus group discussions, although
some allowance was made of the particular nature of the economies in question: manufacturing, trade,
services, IT, agriculture, etc. The participants included representatives (owners and managers) of
micro, small and medium-sized companies, ranging from start-ups to established firms. Standard
templates were used for the discussion and the systematic collection of ratings in the focus groups. 
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VI. The analysis in this report is based on the methodologies described above (focus group research,
expert interviews, secondary data collection, etc.). It is complemented by secondary material
collected by local consultants; use of Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS 2002) data where relevant; and benchmarks and/or indicators of successful experience derived
from OECD-UNIDO-EC-EBRD research.
VII.The information has been analysed by the OECD and EBRD, resulting in the assessment presented in
this regional EPPA. The emphasis is on providing a regional overview of the key trends and issues,
rather than the identification of detailed policy recommendations, as these were presented in the
individual country EPPAs. The regional comparisons generally speak for themselves, allowing the
respective countries to draw their own conclusions and frame appropriate policy reforms. 
VIII. The Investment Compact intends to up-date the individual country EPPAs and the SEE regional EPPA
analysis on a regular basis, now that the regional baseline has been established via this report.  
IX. The organisations involved in the EPPA research are briefly highlighted below: 
Albania: 31 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Tirana (capital city), Vlora
(economically dynamic area) and Shkodra (economically depressed area). The following organisations
also participated in the research, thus validating and enhancing the discussions with small enterprise
managers and owners: Business Promotion Department (Ministry of Economy), Ministry of Finance,
Chamber of Commerce and other SME-related institutions.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: 30 small businesses took part in four focus group discussions in Sarajevo
(capital city of the State and Federation of BiH), Banja Luka region (Republika Srpska), Jajce
(economically deprived cantons in the Federation) and Srpsko Sarajevo (less dynamic regions of the
south-eastern part of Republika Srspka and District of Brcko). The following organisations also
participated in the research: Chamber of Foreign Trade of BiH, Foreign Investment Promotion Agency
of BiH, Association of Entrepreneurs of Doboj (regional business organisation), World Vision
(international micro-finance and development organisation), Brcko District Development Agency and
World Lutheran Union (NGO providing advisory services and technical assistance).
Bulgaria: 18 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Sofia, Haskova and Plovdiv.
The following organisations also participated in the research: National Association of SMEs (a business
organisation), Agency for SMEs (the state implementation institution), BARDA (the association of
regional development agencies), Varna Business Agency (a regional NGO dealing with advisory
services), Bulgarian Craftsmen Chamber and the National Transport Chamber (branch organisation).
Croatia: 18 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Zagreb (capital city region),
Primorsko-Goranska County (Rijeka region) and Medjimurje County (Cakovec region). The following
organisations also participated in the research: Ministry of Crafts, Small and Medium Entrepreneurship;
Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Croatian Chamber of Commerce; Croatian
Association of Business Consultants; Technology Park "Technopark"; Faculty of Economics, Rijeka;
Faculty for Tourism and Hotel Management, Rijeka; Business Incubator Porin, Rijeka; Centre for SME
Development, Rijeka Municipality; Technology Innovation Centre, Rijeka; Office for Economic
Development, Primorsko-Goranska County; Centre of Entrepreneurship Medjimurje, Cakovec;
Chamber of Crafts, Cakovec; Croatian Employment Bureau, Cakovec: Sector for Economic Development,
Medjimurje County Administration; and the Financial Agency, Cakovec.
FYR Macedonia: 20 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Gostivar, Skopje and
the surrounding region. The following organisations also participated in the research: Chambers of
Commerce, Business Associations, NGOs and business consultants.
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Moldova: 47 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Causeni (South), Chisinau
(Centre) and Balti (North). The following organisations also participated in the research: Ministry of
Economy, World Bank, Chamber of Trade and Industries, etc.
Montenegro: 18 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Podgorica, Herceg Novi
and Bijelo Polje. The following organisations also participated in the research: Agency for SMEs (state
implementation institution), Montenegro Business Alliance, Faculty of Economics, European Agency
for Reconstruction, Centre for International Private Enterprise, Central Bank of Montenegro,
Opportunity Bank, Firm Level Assistance Group and USAID.
Romania: 53 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Bucharest, Transylvania
and Moldavia. The following organisations also participated in the research: Associations of SMEs,
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Association of SMEs and Association of Small and Medium Crafts,
Chambers of Commerce, Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs and Association of Women Managers.
Serbia: 22 small businesses took part in three focus group discussions in Belgrade, Central Serbia,
Vojvodina and South Serbia. The following organisations also participated in the research: Centre for
Economic Development, Faculty of Economics and legal/tax experts, etc.
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Annex 3.
LIST OF CONTACTS
INVESTMENT COMPACT FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE
Country Economic Teams
Albania
Mr. Bashkim Sykja (CET Leader) Tel.:  (355 4) 36 46 73
Head of SME and FDI Unit Fax:  (355 4) 22 26 55




Mr. Dragisa Mekic (CET Leader) Tel/Fax: (387 33) 220 546
Assistant Minister Dragisa.Mekic@mvteo.gov.ba
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH
Sector for Foreign Trade Policy and Foreign Investments
Musala 9
71000 Sarajevo
Mr. Marko Tutnjevic (Deputy CET Leader) Tel.:  (387 33) 278 095
Project Manager Fax:  (387 33) 278 081
Foreign Investment Promotion Agency tutnjevic@fipa.gov.ba
Bulgaria
Mr. Pavel Ezekiev (CET Leader) Tel.:  (359 2) 980 03 26
President Fax:  (359 2) 980 13 20
Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency fia@bfia.org 
31 Aksakov Street, 3rd Floor
Sofia 1000
Ms. Iva Stoykova (Deputy CET Leader)
Secretary General Tel.:  (359 2) 980 05 20
Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency Fax:  (359 2) 980 13 20
31 Aksakov Street, 3rd Floor i.stoikova@bfia.org 
Sofia 1000
Croatia
Mr. Krunoslav Placko (CET Leader) Tel.:  (385 1) 6106 835
Assistant Minister Fax:  (385 1) 6109 118
Investment Facilitating Division krunoslav.placko@mingo.hr
Ministry of Economy
Ul. Grada Vukovara 78
10 000 Zagreb
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FYR Macedonia
Mr. Stevco Jakimovski (CET Leader) Tel.:  (389 2) 309 3408/412
Minister Fax:  (389 2) 308 4472/471
Ministry of Economy Stevco.Jakimovski@economy.gov.mk
Jurij Gagarin 15
1000 Skopje
Mr. Gorgi Petrusev (Deputy CET Leader) Tel.:  (389 2) 393 404
State Secretary Fax:  (389 2) 384 472




Mr. Marian Lupu (CET Leader) Tel.:  (373 2) 23 46 28
Minister Fax:  (373 2) 23 74 90
Ministry of Economy mlupu@moldova.md
Government Building
Piata Marii Adunari Nationale 1
MD-2033 Chisinau
Romania
Mr. Cristian Diaconescu (CET Leader) Tel.:  (40 21) 230 71 19
State Secretary for Bilateral Affairs Fax:  (40 21) 230 67 04




Ms. Jelica Minic (CET Leader) Tel.:  (381 11) 361 80 78
Assistant Federal Minister Fax:  (381 11) 361 22 27




Ms. Slavica Milacic (CET Leader) Tel.:  (381 81) 225 568 
Minister Fax:  (381 81) 225 591




Mr. Goran Pitic (CET Leader) Tel.:  (381 11) 361 76 28
Minister Fax:  (381 11) 301 55 30
Ministry of International Economic Relations gpitic@eunet.yu 
Gracanicka 8, 1st Floor
Belgrade
Ms. Slavica Penev (Deputy CET Leader) Tel.:  (381 11) 361 30 49
Chief Foreign Investment Advisor Fax:  (381 11) 361 34 67
Ministry of International Economic Relations penev@eunet.yu 
Gracanicka 8, 1st Floor
Belgrade
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STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE
Dr. Erhard Busek Tel.: (32 2) 401 87 01
Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact Fax: (32 2) 401 87 12
Mr. Fabrizio Saccomanni Tel.: (40 207) 338 74 98
Chairman, Working Table II Fax: (40 207) 338 69 98
Mr. Bernard Snoy Tel.: (32 2) 401 87 15
Director, Working Table II Fax: (32 2) 401 87 12
Rue Wiertz 50, B-1050 Brussels, bernard.snoy@stabilitypact.org
Belgium
Mr. Jani Bogoevski Tel.: (32 2) 401 87 22
Expert, Working Table II Fax: (32 2) 401 87 12
Rue Wiertz 50, B-1050 Brussels, Jani.bogoevski@stabilitypact.org
Belgium
JOINT STABILITY PACT-SECI BUSINESS ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mr. Pierre Daurès (Co-Chairman) Tel.:  (33 1) 30 60 50 20
Executive Vice-President, Bouygues Group Fax:  (33 1) 30 60 33 34
1 avenue Eugène Freyssinet pdaures@bouygues.com
F-78061 Saint Quentin en Yvelines,
France
Mr. Nikos Efthymiadis (Co-Chairman) Tel.: (30 231)/798-226; 798-403 
Sindos Industrial Area of Thessaloniki, P.O. Box 48 Fax: (30 231)/797-376; 796-620
57022 Thessaloniki, ne@efthymiadis.gr 
Greece
Mr. Rahmi Koç (Co-Chairman) Tel: (90 216)/343-1940-41
Koç Holding AS Fax: (90 216)/492-8884
Nakkastepe Azizbey Sokak No. 1 maxinei@koc.com.tr
81207 Kuzguncuk, Istanbul, 
Turkey
Mr. Manfred Nussbaumer (Co-Chairman) Tel.:  (49 711) 78 83 616
Chairman , Board of Directors Fax:   (49 711) 78 83 668
Ed. Züblin AG, HV-VS.Hildebrand@zueblin.de
Albstadtweg 3, D-70567 Stuttgart,
Germany
Ms. Vera M. Budway (Executive Secretary) Tel.:  (32 2) 401 87 08
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Fax:  (32 2)  401 87 12
Rue Wiertz 50, B-1050 Brussels, vera.budway@stabilitypact.org
Belgium
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Austria
Mr. Manfred Schekulin Tel.: (43 1) 711 00 51 80
Director, Export and Investment Policy Department Fax: (43 1) 711 00 15 101




Mr. Rainer Geiger Tel.: (33 1) 45 24 91 03
Deputy Director, Directorate for Financial, Fax: (33 1) 45 24 91 58
Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs rainer.geiger@oecd.org
2, rue André Pascal
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
France
Mr. Declan Murphy Tel.: (33 1) 45 24 97 01
Programme Director, Investment Compact for South East Europe Fax: (33 1) 45 24 93 35
2, rue André Pascal declan.murphy@oecd.org
75775 Paris Cedex 16 
France
Romania
Mr. Cristian Diaconescu Tel.: (40 21) 230 71 19
State Secretary Fax: (40 21) 220 67 04
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cristian.diaconescu@mae.ro
14 Modrogan Street
Sector 1, Bucharest
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) groups 30 member countries
sharing a commitment to democratic government and the market economy. With active relationships with
other countries, Non-Governmental Organisations and civil society, it has a global reach. Best known for its
publications and statistics, its work covers economic and social issues from macroeconomics, to trade,
education, development and science and innovation. Over time the OECD's focus has broadened to include
extensive contacts with non-member economies and it now maintains co-operative relations with some 70
of them. These contacts aim to further economic integration by making the OECD's experience available to
other countries and enabling the OECD to profit from the insights and perspectives of non-members. (see
www.oecd.org)
The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was set up in 1991 to support the
development of market economies in central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent
States following the collapse of communism. The EBRD supports the economies of its 27 countries of
operations by promoting competition, privatisation and entrepreneurship. Taking into account the particular
needs of countries at different stages of transition, the Bank focuses on strengthening the financial sector,
developing infrastructure and supporting industry and commerce. The EBRD is the largest investor in South
Eastern Europe and is also an active contributor to the Stability Pact. (see www.ebrd.com)

